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Articles 
INFORMAL DEFERENCE: A HISTORICAL, 
EMPIRICAL, AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell
ABSTRACT—The Federal Circuit has been the target of a flurry of criticism 
regarding its claim construction jurisprudence. District judges, members of 
the bar, academics, and even the court’s own judges have been highly 
critical of the court’s rate of reversal of claim construction appeals, which 
peaked above 40%. Partially in response to the critics, the Federal Circuit 
undertook to reassess its claim construction jurisprudence in the Phillips 
case in 2005. The empirical and theoretical studies that have emerged since 
Phillips suggest that little has changed: the Federal Circuit’s high reversal 
rate persists and the court’s procedures remain unaltered. 
This Article contradicts those perceptions based on a comprehensive 
empirical analysis of the Federal Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence 
from 2000 through 2011. We find that the reversal rate has dropped 
significantly since Phillips, dipping to 16.5% in 2009 from a high of 44% 
in 2004. Not only has the reversal rate plummeted, it has done so across the 
board: all judges on the Federal Circuit are now more likely to affirm claim 
construction decisions than they were previously, and nearly every 
technology sector case is more likely to be affirmed on appeal. Phillips 
signaled the beginning of an era of increasing yet “informal deference” to 
district court claim construction decisions. 
The current era of informal deference does not mean, however, that the 
problems of claim construction have been adequately resolved. 
Notwithstanding the drop in the reversal rate, the Federal Circuit’s 
adherence to the de novo standard has frustrated district courts’ distinctive 
capabilities for apprehending and resolving the factual disputes inherent in 
claim construction determinations, undermined the transparency of the 
claim construction process, discouraged detailed and transparent 
explanations of claim construction reasoning, and produced alarming levels 
of appellate reversals. The Supreme Court’s Markman decision supports a 
balanced, structurally sound, legally appropriate, hybrid standard of 
appellate review that would promote more accurate, efficient patent dispute 
resolution. Under this standard, the Federal Circuit would defer to trial 
judges’ factual determinations in claim construction rulings—such as how 
a person having ordinary skill in the art would understand technical terms 
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used in a claim—but would retain de novo authority over whether the trial 
court’s factual finding inappropriately overrides more specific intrinsic 
indications of the patent’s scope. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patent claim construction—the process of interpreting patent 
boundaries—is central to the operation of the patent system.1 When 
patentees seek to enforce their rights in court, the interpretation of patent 
 
1 See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2001) (observing that “[d]etermining the scope of the patent claims is the most 
important issue in a patent infringement suit”); Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of 
Claims—American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990) (“[T]he 
name of the game is the claim.” (emphasis omitted)); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the 
Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
1105, 1119 (2004) (finding that “it is clear that claim construction plays a major—and perhaps the 
major—role in patent infringement litigation”); William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and 
Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH. L. REV. 755, 757 (1948) (observing that “[i]n [the United 
States], the claims are regarded as definitions of the invention, rather than mere guides to its scope” and 
“are so all-important on the measure of the grant, they are the subject of energetic and often protracted 
contest between applicants and examiners in Patent Office proceedings”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
4 
claim boundaries guides both infringement and validity analysis.2 As a 
result, patent prosecutors devote substantial effort to crafting patent claims 
that maximize scope while differentiating prior art.3 Businesses seeking to 
enter the marketplace must be careful to avoid encroaching patent claims or 
risk liability for patent infringement. 
Notwithstanding the critical importance of claim boundaries to both 
patentees and competitors, the processes and doctrines governing the 
construction of patent claims are notoriously amorphous and uncertain. The 
United States Patent and Trademark Office devotes relatively little effort to 
clarifying patent boundaries in the examination process.4 Thus, when 
patentees seek to enforce their patents, the task of claim construction falls 
to generalist federal district court judges, few of whom have technical 
training or experience with patent law.5 
Claim construction’s importance to the patent system has led to a large 
body of literature critical of modern claim construction practice.6 Much of 
 
2 Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured 
Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 714 (2010). 
3 See Woodward, supra note 1. 
4 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 n.19 
(2001) (noting estimates that patent examiners devote less than twenty hours, on average, to reviewing 
patents). 
5 See The Honorable S. Jay Plager, Abolish the Court of Federal Claims? A Question of 
Democratic Principle, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 791, 797 (2003) (observing that “[m]ost district court 
judges do not have scientific training, and most have not chosen law clerks with technical or patent 
backgrounds”); cf. Judge James F. Holderman in collaboration with Halley Guren, The Patent 
Litigation Predicament in the United States, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 5 (stating that most 
fellow district court judges do not share his enthusiasm for patent cases). 
6 See, e.g., Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time 
Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 215–86 (2001) 
(criticizing the Federal Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, 
Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1746–48 
(2009) (suggesting that patent law look to central claiming to reduce the uncertainty in claim 
construction); Russell B. Hill & Frank P. Cote, Ending the Federal Circuit Crapshoot: Emphasizing 
Plain Meaning in Patent Claim Interpretation, 42 IDEA 1, 8–15 (2002) (proposing increased use of 
“plain meaning” in claim construction); Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases 
Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 237, 300 (2006) (noting the high cost of patent claim construction); Mark A. Lemley, The 
Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 118–19 (2005) (arguing that patent 
claim terms should have a fixed meaning at the time of the patent application); Mark A. Lemley, The 
Limits of Claim Differentiation, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1391–94 (2007) (arguing for limits on 
the doctrine of claim differentiation); Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful 
Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177, 199–210 (2005) (looking to the patent 
specification for claim construction guidance); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 
14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4, 7–9 (2000) (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s hypertextualist jurisprudence, 
generally); Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61, 83–84 
(2006) (proposing a linguistic-based approach to claim construction); Lee Petherbridge, The Claim 
Construction Effect, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 215, 218–19 (2008) (describing the 
difficulty inherent in the claim construction process); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An 
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the criticism originates from the high reversal rates of claim construction 
appeals—ranging from 35% to 44%.7 One district court judge has observed 
that in view of such a high reversal rate, “you might as well throw darts.”8 
Numerous scholars have argued that the source of uncertainty in claim 
construction is the Federal Circuit itself: the court’s jurisprudence is 
difficult to understand and at times contradictory.9 Even the Federal 
Circuit’s landmark 2005 decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp.,10 which many 
viewed as a potential watershed moment, did not appease the critics. 
According to the academic studies following Phillips, very little has 
changed—the high reversal rate persists and the Federal Circuit’s claim 
construction methodology remains unclear.11 
 
Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 267 
(2008) (finding that experience with claim construction does not improve district court reversal odds). 
7 See Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (reporting a 44% reversal rate); Kimberly A. Moore, 
Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 
233 (2005) (reporting a 34.5% reversal rate); Michael Saunders, A Survey of Post-Phillips Claim 
Construction Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 215, 232–35 (2007); Andrew T. Zidel, Patent Claim 
Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance from the Federal 
Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 745–46 (2003) (reporting a 41.5% reversal rate). But see Jeffrey 
A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1033, 1038–39 (2007) (arguing that the patent claim construction reversal rate is not substantially 
higher than reversal rates observed in other forms of complex litigation). 
8 See Anandashankar Mazumdar, Federal District Courts Need Experts that Are Good ‘Teachers,’ 
Judges Tell Bar, 70 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 536, 537 (Sept. 16, 2005) (quoting 
Judge Marsha J. Penchman of the U.S. District Court of Western Washington); see also Ultratech, Inc. 
v. Tamarack Scientific Co., No. C 03-03235 CRB, 2005 WL 2562623, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2005) 
(“Nor can the Court say that Ultratech’s claim construction position is so frivolous as to warrant 
sanctions; to be candid, this Court is reluctant to hold that any claim construction is frivolous, given the 
well-known reversal rate in the Federal Circuit.”); The Honorable Kathleen M. O’Malley et al., A Panel 
Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
671, 682 (2004) (noting that some district court judges are “demoralize[d]” by the high reversal rate) 
(remarks of Judge Patti Saris). The Federal Circuit has noted the concern. See Merck & Co. v. Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader J., dissenting) (noting that the Federal 
Circuit “often hears criticism from district court judges that its reversal rate on claim construction issues 
far exceeds that of other circuit courts”). 
9 See Bender, supra note 6, at 211, 217; Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1771; Hill & Cote, supra 
note 6, at 2; Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim 
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123, 133–46 (2005); Miller, supra note 6, at 182; Kelly Casey 
Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 334 
(2007); Nard, supra note 6, at 82; Osenga, supra note 6, at 68–73; Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 
1. 
10 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
11 See Neil E. Graham, Judges Debate Legacy of Phillips: Landmark Ruling or ‘Nothing New’?, 
70 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 413, 413 (Aug. 5, 2005) (quoting Judge Susan Braden as 
characterizing the Phillips decision as “much ado about nothing”); Cheryl Lee Johnson, The Continuing 
Inability of Judges to Pass Their Markman Tests: Why the Broken System Leaves Judges Behind, 
Confused and Demoralized, in MARKMAN HEARINGS AND CLAIM CONSTRUCTION IN PATENT 
LITIGATION 2008, at 69, 108 (2008) (declaring that “[w]hat Phillips delivered was disappointment”); 
Saunders, supra note 7, at 239 (finding that post-Phillips “reversal rates remain substantially the same” 
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This Article calls this perception into question based on a 
comprehensive empirical analysis of the Federal Circuit’s claim 
construction jurisprudence from 2000 through 2011. The data show that the 
claim construction reversal rate has dropped significantly since the Phillips 
decision: from 38.6% to 25.6% on a per-claim-term basis. The reversal rate 
on a per-case basis (i.e., percentage of cases with at least one reversed 
claim term) has fallen from 41.8% prior to Phillips to 31.6% following the 
decision. During 2009, the reversal rate dipped to 16.5%. The reversal rate 
for 2011 was 20.4%. Since Phillips, each Federal Circuit judge has become 
more likely to affirm claim construction appeals than he or she was before 
the decision. Furthermore, claim construction decisions are now more 
likely to be affirmed on appeal across nearly all technologies. 
While the Federal Circuit continues to adhere to de novo standard of 
review for claim construction rulings,12 our data indicate that Phillips 
triggered an era of “informal deference” on the court. Phillips signaled a 
softening of the Federal Circuit’s approach to deference even though the 
court declined to repudiate the de novo standard expressly. The Federal 
Circuit has steadfastly held that it owes no deference to district court claim 
construction rulings,13 notwithstanding indications in the Supreme Court’s 
1996 Markman decision that claim construction can entail factual 
determinations.14 Many judges on the court take issue with that view.15 The 
lack of consensus among judges on the Federal Circuit continues to 
produce uncertainty and confusion for the patent system. On March 15, 
2013, the Federal Circuit granted a petition for en banc review on: 
 
and while Phillips has had “some effect on claim construction reasoning, [it] has not resolved the 
underlying disputes and problems with claim construction”); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did 
Phillips Change Anything? Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction 
Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 
2013) (finding that Phillips has done little to ameliorate the methodological disputes on the Federal 
Circuit and has “undermined . . . efforts to develop a coherent and predictable jurisprudence”) 
(manuscript at 148) (on file with authors). 
12 See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
13 See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(Moore, J., joined by Rader, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
833 (2013); Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010); id. at 
1363–64 (Clark, District Judge (E.D. Tex.), concurring); Medegen MMS, Inc. v. ICU Med., Inc., 317 F. 
App’x 982, 988–91 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Walker, Chief District Judge (N.D. Cal.), dissenting) (urging 
greater deference); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(Michel, C.J., joined by Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
14 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 378, 388, 390 (1996) (noting that 
“construing a term of art following receipt of evidence” is “a mongrel practice”; claim construction 
“falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact”; and “there is sufficient 
reason to treat construction of terms of art like many other responsibilities that we cede to a judge in the 
normal course of trial, notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings”). 
15 See, e.g., Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1373 (Moore, J., joined by Rader, C.J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc); id. (O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Amgen, 
469 F.3d at 1040 (Michel, C.J., joined by Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
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(1) whether it should overrule Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 
(2) whether it should “afford deference to any aspect of a district court’s 
claim construction,” and (3) “[i]f so, which aspects should be afforded 
deference.”16 
Our Article provides a way forward for a court torn between a formal 
de novo standard of review and a pragmatic, informal, and deferential 
standard. The Supreme Court’s Markman decision supports a balanced, 
structurally sound, legally appropriate, hybrid standard of appellate review 
that would promote more accurate, efficient patent dispute resolution. 
Under this standard, the Federal Circuit would defer to trial judges’ factual 
determinations in claim construction rulings—such as how a person having 
ordinary skill in the art would understand technical terms used in a claim—
but would retain de novo authority over whether the trial court’s factual 
finding inappropriately overrides more specific intrinsic indications of the 
patent’s scope. 
The hybrid standard of appellate review of claim construction rulings 
appropriately leverages trial judges’ special ability to develop the 
evidentiary record needed to resolve the mixed fact and law controversies 
inherent in patent claim construction while enhancing the quality of 
appellate review. According greater deference to trial courts through clear 
error review of the factual underpinnings of claim construction rulings that 
are supported by sound evidentiary processes, properly documented 
records, and transparent reasoning would promote more systematic, well-
founded claim construction analysis. Combining this deferential review of 
factual findings with de novo review of the overarching claim construction 
determination would provide the appropriate appellate safeguard. 
We set the stage for our analysis in Part I by tracing the evolution of 
patent claim construction jurisprudence from the enactment of patent 
protection shortly after the founding of the United States to the present. 
Part II describes our empirical methodology and reports key findings with 
regard to reversal rates, evidentiary sources, doctrinal patterns, judge-
specific patterns, technology patterns, and procedural patterns. Part III 
evaluates potential explanations for our empirical results. Part IV provides 
a normative analysis of the standard of review for claim construction 
rulings. Drawing on the historical and empirical analyses, it contends that 
although the shift toward informal deference has been salutary, formal 
recognition of a more deferential standard would produce a richer factual 
record for claim construction determinations, better grounded decisions, 
and more transparent rulings while encouraging earlier settlement of cases. 
 
16 See Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 500 F. App’x 951, 951–52 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
Since the Supreme Court’s 1996 Markman decision, claim 
construction has taken on a central role in patent case management as a 
distinct procedural stage, a tool for facilitating summary judgment, and a 
foundation for expert reports.17 To more fully appreciate the modern claim 
construction era and as background for our normative analysis, this Part 
traces the evolution of patent claim construction. 
The formal process of a judge construing patent claims is of relatively 
recent vintage and reflects the confluence of four principal factors: (1) the 
emergence of patent claiming in the early nineteenth century, (2) the shift 
from central claiming to peripheral claiming in the mid- to late nineteenth 
century, (3) the shift in infringement jurisprudence toward a focus on claim 
boundaries beginning in the late nineteenth century, and (4) the resurgence 
of patent jury trials in the 1970s after more than a century of disuse. 
A. Early History 
1. 1790–1836: The “Invention” and Emergence of Patent 
 Claims.—The development of claim construction logically begins 
with the emergence of patent claiming. As Karl Lutz explained, “nothing in 
the nature of a claim had appeared either in British patent practice or in that 
of the American states” prior to 1790.18 At its inception in 1790, the U.S. 
patent system required: 
a specification in writing, containing a description, accompanied with drafts or 
models, and explanations and models (if the nature of the invention or 
discovery will admit of a model) of the thing or things, by him or them 
invented or discovered, and described as aforesaid, in the said patents.19 
There was no requirement that the inventor specifically claim the invention, 
and most early patents did not contain formal claims.20 Rather, applicants 
focused on describing the invention.21 
The 1790 Patent Act was short-lived for several reasons. It tasked the 
Secretary of State (Thomas Jefferson), the Secretary for the Department of 
War, and the Attorney General with personally examining patents, which, 
 
17 See PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE ch. 5 (2d ed. 2012). 
18 See Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 134, 134 
(1938). 
19 See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110. 
20 See Lutz, supra note 18, at 134–35; Woodward, supra note 1, at 758. 
21 See ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. at 110 (requiring applicants to “distinguish the invention or discovery from 
other things before known”); Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (requiring applicants to 
“distinguish the same from all other things before known”). 
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in light of their other responsibilities, proved untenable.22 Second, inventors 
were displeased with the high and vague threshold for protection: that 
inventions be deemed “sufficiently useful and important.”23 
As a result, in 1793 Congress struck the requirement that inventions be 
“sufficiently useful and important” and replaced the examination process 
with a registration system,24 leaving the evaluation of patentability entirely 
to the courts. The Patent Act of 1793 retained a terse standard for 
patentability: an inventor could patent “any new and useful art, machine, 
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or 
used before the application.”25 The inventor was still required to provide a 
written description of the invention and the manner of use 
in such full, clear and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other 
things before known, and to enable any person skilled in the art or science, of 
which it is a branch, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, 
compound, and use the same.26 
Following this directive and usages growing out of the English statute 
and practice on which the U.S. patent system was based, the first American 
patents merely described the invention in general terms. According to Lutz, 
the “earliest suggestion of the claim . . . was the inclusion in the description 
of a statement that the patentee did not intend to be limited to the specific 
disclosure of the patent.”27 Such negative limitations would come to be 
disfavored in Patent Office guidance.28 
Woodward credits Robert Fulton, developer of the first commercially 
successful steamboat, with “inventing” the patent claim.29 His 1811 patent 
stated: 
 Having been the first to demonstrate the superior advantages of a water 
wheel or wheels, I claim as my exclusive right, the use of two wheels, one 
over each side of the boat to take the purchase on the water . . . .30 
 
22 See P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 237, 238, 251 
(1936); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Hugh Williamson (Apr. 1, 1792), reprinted in 6 THE WORKS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 458, 459 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., fed. ed. 1904). 
23 Steven Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent Law, 32 TECH. & CULTURE (SPECIAL 
ISSUE) 932, 935–36 (1991) (quoting Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7 § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 100). 
24 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318. 
25 See id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 319. 
26 See id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 321. 
27 Lutz, supra note 18, at 135 (citing a 1799 patent). 
28 See id. at 136. 
29 See Woodward, supra note 1, at 758 (describing Fulton’s patent granted on February 9, 1811); 
accord Lutz, supra note 18, at 137 (commenting that “Fulton can perhaps more properly be credited 
with invention of the ‘claim’ than of the steamboat”). 
30 See Lutz, supra note 18, at 136–37 (emphasis added). 
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Although there were sporadic examples in the first two decades of the 
nineteenth century of patents expressly claiming inventions, such explicit 
claiming was not the general practice.31 
Justice Joseph Story, who would emerge as the leading patent jurist of 
the first half of the nineteenth century,32 immediately came to see the 
problems with vague and conclusory descriptions of inventions. Sitting in 
his first patent case (and the first case to focus on the question of 
distinguishing a patented invention from the prior art33), he noted the 
“intrinsic difficulty . . . to ascertain . . . the exact boundaries between what 
was known and used before, and what is new.”34 Justice Story charged the 
jury that if the plaintiff did not invent “the whole machine” and only 
contributed “an improvement,” the plaintiff’s patent must be deemed “too 
broad” and “utterly void” because it was “clearly a patent for the whole 
machine.”35 Justice Story explicated this principle more fully four years 
later, charging the jury that: 
A patent is grantable only for a new and useful invention; and, unless it be 
distinctly stated, in what that invention specifically consists, it is impossible to 
say, whether it ought to be patented or not; and it is equally difficult to know, 
whether the public infringe upon or violate the exclusive right secured by the 
patent.36 
The early judicial focus on patent clarity was directed to the question 
of patent validity—whether the specification adequately described the 
invention “in such full, clear and exact terms, as to distinguish the same 
from all other things before known”37—as opposed to patent infringement.38 
In 1822, the Supreme Court in Evans v. Eaton upheld the trial court’s 
decision invalidating Evans’s patent for failure to distinguish his 
improvement from the prior art: 
 
31 See id. at 138. 
32 See Peter S. Menell, The Mixed Heritage of Federal Intellectual Property Law and Ramifications 
for Statutory Interpretation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW, supra note 11, at 
72–73 & n.65; Frank D. Prager, The Influence of Mr. Justice Story on American Patent Law, 5 AM. J. 
LEG. HIST. 254 (1961). 
33 See Lutz, supra note 18, at 138. 
34 See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123, 1124 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,601); see also 
Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432) (noting the “intrinsic 
difficulty”). 
35 See Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1123. 
36 See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1020 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568). 
37 See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321. 
38 See Woodward, supra note 1, at 760 (explaining that “the courts for a long time did not regard 
the particular formulations chosen by the inventor to express his claim and distinguish his invention 
from the prior art as the definitive measure of the scope of the patent”). 
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We do not say that the party is bound to describe the old machine; but we are 
of opinion that he ought to describe what his own improvement is, and to limit 
his patent to such improvement.39 
Consequently, patent drafters began to include formal patent claims at 
the end of their applications for the purpose of avoiding invalidation on the 
ground of defective specification.40 In 1828, Dr. Thomas P. Jones, the 
Superintendent of the Patent Office, published an article entitled 
“Information to Persons Applying for Patents, or Transacting Other 
Business at the Patent Office,” instructing applicants that: 
 No more must be claimed in the patent, than what is new, and is the 
invention, or discovery, of the patentee. 
 Many patents have been vacated, in consequence of inattention to this last 
rule. In the specification it is perfectly proper to describe an entire machine, 
although most parts of it may have been long known and used, as, otherwise, 
it may be difficult to make known the improvements; but after doing this, the 
patentee should distinctly set forth what he claims as new; and this is best 
done in a separate paragraph, at the end of the specification . . . .41 
Thus, by the late 1820s, it had become common practice for patent 
applicants to include a formal designation of the claimed invention in a 
separate paragraph at the end of the specification.42 
2. 1836–1870: The Rise and Fall of Central Claiming, the Shift to 
Bench Trials, and the Emergence of Peripheral Claims as the 
Measure of Patent Scope.—The lack of an examination system 
eroded faith in the patent system due to the proliferation of “unrestrained 
and promiscuous grants of patent privileges.”43 In response, the Patent Act 
of 1836 reinstituted examination in a newly constituted Patent Office and 
encouraged claiming conventions that grew out of jurisprudence44 by 
requiring applicants to “particularly specify and point out the part, 
 
39 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 435 (1822); see also Isaacs v. Cooper, 13 F. Cas. 153, 154 (C.C.D Pa. 
1821) (No. 7096) (denying relief on the ground that “the nature of the improvement is altogether 
unintelligible”). 
40 See N.J. Brumbaugh, History and Purpose of Claims in United States Patent Law, 14 J. PAT. 
OFF. SOC’Y 273, 276–77 (1932); Lutz, supra note 18, at 139–40. 
41 See Thomas P. Jones, Information to Persons Applying for Patents, or Transacting Other 
Business at the Patent Office, 6 FRANKLIN J. & AM. MECHANICS’ MAG. 332, 334 (1828). 
42 See Brumbaugh, supra note 40, at 276 (observing that patent practitioners had “almost 
universally” been claiming their inventions in the years leading up to the 1836 Act). 
43 See JOHN RUGGLES, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO TAKE INTO 
CONSIDERATION THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE PATENT OFFICE, S. DOC. NO. 24-338, at 4 (1836). 
44 See Brumbaugh, supra note 40, at 276 (commenting that the 1836 Act “merely endorsed and 
positively required what inventors had been doing voluntarily for years”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
12 
improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention or 
discovery.”45 
The form of patent claiming that emerged during this period—which 
has come to be known as “central” claiming—differs substantially from the 
“peripheral” format in common usage today. Furthermore, the prevalence 
of patent jury trials increased substantially during the mid-nineteenth 
century. The early claiming format responded to the invalidation of 
overbroad claiming identified in such cases as Whittemore v. Cutter and 
Evans v. Eaton by using “reference characters”—alpha-numeric labels for 
patent drawings—to specify particular structural components illustrating 
their improvement.46 The Patent Office’s Rules of Practice as late as 1869 
recommended use of reference characters in patent claims.47 
Aside from the format in which claims were written, claims from this 
era differed from modern practice in their application and importance at 
trial. Claims were not used during this era as the basis for assessing patent 
infringement. The early infringement standard measured the accused device 
against the entirety of the patent, sometimes with reference to the 
patentee’s actual device, using a substantial identity test.48 The courts only 
gradually and episodically came to see the importance of claim boundaries 
in evaluating patent infringement.49 
Thus, even though most patent cases were tried to juries through the 
mid-nineteenth century, claim construction was relatively limited and 
largely fell outside of the jury’s role.50 Infringement focused on the 
operative principle of the invention as set forth in the specification and the 
patentee’s device. As Lutz described: 
 As time went on complete control of the interpretation of patent documents 
was gradually transferred to the judge. When it became apparent that the jury 
was not equal to the task, the custom developed of having the judge include in 
his charge to the jury a detailed interpretation of the patent coupled with 
 
45 See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (emphasis added); see also Lutz, supra note 
18, at 143 (“This addition to the statute had no immediate effect on the form or substance of claims 
because it was understood as merely codifying the existing law which had been developed by the 
courts.”). 
46 See RIDSDALE ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS §§ 3–5 (1949). 
47 See id. § 5. 
48 See Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432) (Story, J.) 
(instructing the jury to determine infringement based on substantiality); GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
§ 220, at 262 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1849) (“An infringement involves substantial 
identity, whether that identity is described by the terms, ‘same principle,’ same modus operandi, or any 
other.”); Woodward, supra note 1, at 760. 
49 See Wyeth v. Stone 30 F. Cas. 723, 727–28 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107) (Story, J.); Lutz, 
supra note 18, at 145; Woodward, supra note 1, at 760–65. 
50 See Lutz, supra note 18, at 143 (observing that “[f]or approximately the first twenty years 
[following 1836] all infringement cases continued to be tried at law before a jury”). 
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instructions that his interpretation was binding on the jury. Another 
contributing influence was the increasing reliance of the patentees on the 
growing equity power of the courts, a practice which necessitated interpreting 
the patent on applications for injunctions, and which finally gave the judge 
complete equity jurisdiction of infringement cases.51 
Thus, claim construction was relatively limited and largely outside of the 
jury’s purview during this era. 
Even before the 1836 Act, some applicants began using a more radical 
claiming format that would come to be known as “peripheral” claiming.52 
These claims used linguistic formulations, rather than references to specific 
improvements, to delineate the metes and bounds of the claimed invention. 
3. 1870–1970: The Rise of Peripheral Claiming, Shift in the Role of 
Claims in Infringement Analysis, and Decline of Patent Jury 
Trials.—The Patent Act of 1870 formalized use of patent claims 
by requiring applicants to “particularly point out and distinctly claim the 
part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or 
discovery.”53 Claims were already in universal use by that time. Of greater 
importance is the dramatic shift from central to peripheral claiming. As 
illustrated in Table 1, that transformation was almost entirely complete by 
the turn of the twentieth century, laying the foundation for the system of 
peripheral claiming and the multiplicity of claims per patent that 
predominates today. 
TABLE 1: EVOLUTION OF CLAIM PRACTICE54 
Year of  
Issue of Patents 
Percentage of Claims Having 
Reference Characters 
Average Number  
of Claims 
1860 73%* 1.3 
1880 82%* 3.3 
1900 22% 7.7 
1920 0% 7.2 
1940 0% 6.9 
*Many of the claims not having reference characters were process claims. 
 
Several institutions and factors contributed to this dramatic 
transformation in the nature of patent claiming. Although some 
commentators cite the passage of the 1870 Act as the major precipitating 
 
51 See id. 
52 See, e.g., Washburn v. Gould, 29 F. Cas. 312, 313–14, (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No. 17,214) 
(quoting from a patent for “a new and useful improvement in the method of planing, tonguing, 
grooving, and cutting into mouldings” registered in 1828); R. CARL MOY, 1 MOY’S WALKER ON 
PATENTS § 4:2, at 4-18 to -20 (4th ed. 2006). 
53 See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (emphasis added). 
54 See ELLIS, supra note 46, § 6. 
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factor,55 the Patent Office had already begun the push toward peripheral 
claiming well before that date. As Lutz describes,56 the Patent Office issued 
a series of pamphlets—including “Guide to Practice of the Patent Office” 
in 1852 and “Rules and Directions for Proceedings in the Patent Office” in 
1862 and 1863—refining claiming practice and advocating greater 
specificity.57 Under the leadership of Commissioner Samuel Sparks Fisher, 
the Patent Office began publishing the Commissioner’s decisions in 
January 1869.58 Building on this effort, the Patent Office would begin 
publishing the Official Gazette, a weekly journal, in 1872.59 Brumbaugh 
explains that “[t]hese decisions . . . show[] the beginning of the present 
practice of the office with reference to the positive inclusion of elements in 
a claim.”60 
It is evident from these first published decisions that the Patent Office 
sought more detailed and clear articulation of patent claims. In Ex parte 
Rubens, Commissioner Fisher expressed: 
The claim should state all the elements of the combination intended to be 
patented, and if the parts are the same in name and number as in some prior 
machine, and the improvement consists in some modification of one or more 
of those parts, the claim should distinctly state that modification.61 
Other decisions from this transformative period upheld claims lacking 
reference characters,62 permitted “genus claiming,”63 and signaled 
receptivity to multiple claims in stating that “claims in different forms . . . 
prevent misconstructions.”64 
The courts also played a critical role in the shift toward peripheral 
claiming, although the dramatic change of judicial course followed rather 
 
55 See, e.g., Nard, supra note 6, at 13 n.50; Joseph S. Cianfrani, An Economic Analysis of the 
Doctrine of Equivalents, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶ 13 (1997), available at http://www.vjolt.net/vol1/
issue/vol1_art1.pdf. 
56 See Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 457 (1938). 
57 Id. at 464–66, 487–88. 
58 See William Edgar Simonds, Preface to A DIGEST OF PATENT OFFICE DECISIONS, 1869–1879, at 
v (William Edgar Simonds ed., Washington, D.C., W.H. & O.H. Morrison 1880); Biographical 
Sketches of the Commissioners of Patents, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y (CENTENNIAL NUMBER) 145, 174 
(1936) (“[Col. Fisher’s] decisions were so illuminating, logical and concise as to necessarily compel 
attention.”). 
59 See Legislative Changes Since 1836, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y (CENTENNIAL NUMBER) 103, 115 
(1936). 
60 See Brumbaugh, supra note 40, at 283; see also Woodward, supra note 1, at 764 (reporting that 
“[w]hen in 1866 a program was adopted for printing all specifications, including those of patents issued 
since 1836, the plan provided for putting the separate clauses of the claiming part into separate 
numbered paragraphs, to conform with the practice that had in the meanwhile become general”). 
61 See Ex parte Charles Rubens & Co., 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 107, 108. 
62 See Ex parte Continental Windmill Co., 1870 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 74, 75. 
63 See Ex parte Eagle, 1870 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 137, 137. 
64 See Ex parte Perry & Lay, 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1, 1. 
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than led the Patent Office’s efforts. During the period when central 
claiming predominated, courts did not view claim language as a restriction 
on a patent’s scope.65 Rather, courts used claims as well as the specification 
to ascertain the patent’s underlying inventive principle, which provided the 
baseline for evaluating whether the defendant’s device embodied this 
principle, either identically or in a substantially equivalent manner.66 
This approach to determining infringement reached its apogee in the 
Supreme Court’s 1853 decision in Winans v. Denmead,67 which applied this 
doctrine of equivalents. Writing for a narrow majority of the Court, Justice 
Benjamin Curtis reversed the trial judge on the ground that the defendants’ 
rail cars were “substantially the same” “structure,” “mode of operation,” 
and “result.”68 The court focused not on the wording of the claim, but rather 
on what it considered to be the substance of the invention: the “new mode 
of operation.”69 The majority pointedly downplayed the role of claim 
language in restricting patent scope.70 
Justice Campbell, joined by three other members of the Court, 
dissented in an opinion emphasizing the need for patents to provide clear 
notice of their boundaries to the public.71 “Fulness, clearness, exactness, 
preciseness, and particularity, in the description of the invention, its 
principle, and of the matter claimed to be invented, will alone fulfil the 
demands of Congress or the wants of the country” in promoting 
competition and innovation.72 In the dissent’s view, the “language of the 
patent is full, clear, and exact. The claim is particular and specific. Neither 
the specification nor the claim . . . embrace the workmanship of the 
defendants.”73 
 
65 See Lutz, supra note 18, at 147 (explaining that “claims rarely, if ever, received consideration on 
the question of infringement” prior to 1870); but cf. Woodward, supra note 1, at 760 (noting that as 
early as 1831, a few courts “expressed that the claims of a patent might bind the patentee against 
assertion of a broader scope for the patent on the question of infringement”). 
66 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723, 728 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107) (Story, J.) 
(instructing jury that patentee is not “bound down to any precise form of words”); Odiorne v. Winkley, 
18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432) (Story, J.) (stating in charging the jury that “[t]he 
material question, therefore, is not whether the same elements of motion, or the same component parts 
are used, but whether the given effect is produced substantially by the same mode of operation, and the 
same combination of powers, in both machines”); CURTIS, supra note 48 (explaining the principle of 
“substantial identity” in patent infringement cases). 
67 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853). 
68 Id. at 338–41. 
69 Id. at 341. 
70 See id. at 343 (holding that a patent extends beyond the words of the claim to “every form in 
which his invention may be copied”). 
71 See id. at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 347–48. 
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The Campbell dissent’s view ultimately prevailed. In two 1877 
Supreme Court decisions—Merrill v. Yeomans74 and Keystone Bridge Co. 
v. Phoenix Iron Co.75—the Supreme Court embraced patent law’s public 
notice function by linking the scope of patent protection to the metes and 
bounds set forth in patent claims. This contributed to the decline of central 
claiming76 and eventually made claim construction an essential step in 
infringement analysis. In a watershed passage in Merrill, the Court 
explained the critical role of clearly identifiable patent boundaries for 
technological and economic advance: 
The genius of the inventor, constantly making improvements in existing 
patents—a process which gives to the patent system its greatest value,—
should not be restrained by vague and indefinite descriptions of claims in 
existing patents from the salutary and necessary right of improving on that 
which has already been invented. It seems to us that nothing can be more just 
and fair, both to the patentee and to the public, than that the former should 
understand, and correctly describe, just what he has invented, and for what he 
claims a patent.77 
The patent claim quickly emerged as the defining feature of the 
patent.78 In his seminal 1890 treatise, William C. Robinson characterized it 
as “the office of the Claim to define the limits of that exclusive use which 
is secured to the inventor by the patent”;79 “[t]he Claim is thus the life of 
the patent so far as the rights of the inventor are concerned.”80 This shift 
brought claim construction to a prominent role in patent litigation. As 
Robinson explained, “The paramount importance of the Claim, and the 
necessity for such exactness and completeness in its statements as will 
precisely define the invention to be protected by the patent, have led to the 
establishment of numerous rules for framing it.”81 
Regarding the allocation of responsibility for construing patent claims, 
Robinson recognized that “[t]he duty of interpreting letters-patent has been 
 
74 94 U.S. 568, 573–74 (1876). 
75 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877). 
76 See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1142–45 (2008) (Lefstin cites Merrill as establishing the foundation for 
“[a]n ordered and logical system of patent law” based on “an ordered and logical system for defining 
patent rights. The system of peripheral claiming, in which the claims set forth the boundaries of the 
patent, served both ends.”). 
77 See Merrill, 94 U.S. at 573–74. 
78 See Burns v. Meyer, 100 U.S. 671, 672 (1879) (“The courts, therefore, should be careful not to 
enlarge, by construction, the claim which the Patent Office has admitted, and which the patentee has 
acquiesced in, beyond the fair interpretation of its terms.”). 
79 See 2 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 504, at 110 
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1890). 
80 See id. § 505, at 111. 
81 See id. § 507, at 115. 
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committed to the courts.”82 He cited the 1845 case of Emerson v. Hogg,83 
where the court found error in delegating a question of construction to the 
jury.84 Robinson based this allocation of responsibility on the principle that 
the courts have primacy in interpreting legal instruments.85 Following the 
court in Emerson v. Hogg and other authority,86 Robinson characterized 
patent interpretation as a “question[] of law.”87 He justified this treatment 
on the functional consideration that: 
To treat the nature of the patented invention as a matter of fact, to be inquired 
of and determined by a jury, would at once deprive the inventor of the 
opportunity to obtain a permanent and universal definition of his rights under 
the patent, and in each case of infringement it would subject him to the danger 
of a false interpretation, from the consequences of which he could not escape. 
By confiding this duty to the court, however, its decision as to the nature of 
the patented invention becomes reviewable to the same extent as any other 
legal question, and when his patent has received the interpretation of the 
Supreme Court of the United States the inventor can maintain his privilege, as 
thus interpreted, against all opponents without further controversy in reference 
to its true limitations.88 
Notwithstanding the characterization of claim construction as a 
“question of law,” Robinson nonetheless recognized that: 
In its interpretation of a patent the court may have recourse to any testimony 
to explain the meaning of its language, or to expert evidence to ascertain the 
essential characteristics of the described invention and the differences between 
it and other patented inventions, or to papers in the Patent Office which are 
connected with the patent or whose contents were known to the inventor at the 
date of his application, to show the significance which he attached to the terms 
that he employed. But of whatever aid the courts avail themselves, their 
interpretation must be based upon the patent as it stands, and when its scope is 
 
82 See id. § 732, at 481. 
83 8 F. Cas. 628 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1845) (No. 4440), aff’d, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 437 (1848). 
84 See id. at 631 (“It is the province and the duty of the court to settle the meaning of the 
patent . . . .”). 
85 See ROBINSON, supra note 79, § 732, at 481; see also id. § 733, at 483 n.1 (“There is great reason 
and importance for this distribution of the respective duties of the court and the jury. The import of the 
instrument is purely a question of law. The interpretation of complicated instruments of writing is a 
special occupation, requiring, like all others, special training and practice. The judge, from his training 
and discipline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation to such instruments than a jury . . . . The 
action of a judge, in such a case as that of interpreting the specification, is moreover open to review and 
correction, by reconsideration on his part, or by the revisal of a superior or appellate court . . . .” 
(quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No. 10,740))). 
86 8 F. Cas. at 631; Nat’l Car-Brake Shoe Co. v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 19 F. 514 (C.C.D. 
Ind. 1884). 
87 See ROBINSON, supra note 79, § 732, at 482. 
88 See id. § 733, at 483–84. 
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once fairly apparent it can neither be limited nor extended by extraneous 
evidence.89 
Thus, the nature of claim construction had a distinctive character, which the 
Supreme Court would later describe as a “mongrel” practice—a legal 
question based on underlying factual determinations reserved, 
notwithstanding the Seventh Amendment, to the trial judge.90 
Although Merrill and Keystone Bridge Co. contributed to the 
centrality of claim restrictions in defining a patent’s scope, claim drafting 
and claim construction continued to evolve over the next century.91 It was 
quite common for courts to integrate their judgment about an inventor’s 
contribution to the art into their evaluation of a patent’s scope.92 Judge 
Learned Hand would later remark: “No doubt the interpretation of patent 
claims depends more upon the advance made by the inventor than upon the 
words used, and in spite of protestations to the contrary, courts do at times 
play fast and loose with them as they do not with other formal 
documents.”93 Writing sixty years after the Supreme Court’s Merrill 
decision, Lutz would state that “[t]he controversy as to whether the claim 
should be taken as a literal ‘definition’ of the invention persists to this 
day.”94 
4. 1970–1995: The Resurgence of Patent Jury Trials.—By the 
1970s, the shift toward construing patent scope based on claim restrictions 
reached full fruition.95 Largely coincidental with the ascendancy of the 
patent claim as a touchstone for determining patent scope, claim 
construction became subsumed in judicial deliberations as a result of the 
shift away from patent jury trials. The 1870 Act granted equity courts the 
power to award common law damages in patent cases,96 prompting litigants 
to favor bench trials.97 By 1940, the first year in which statistics on the 
 
89 See 3 ROBINSON, supra note 79, § 1019, at 248 (footnote omitted). 
90 See infra Part I.B.1. 
91 See John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their “Interpretive Community”: 
A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 348–62 (2008). 
92 See Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 63 (1923) (stating that the 
apparent conflict between strictly construing patent claims and finding equivalents could be explained 
by courts’ “differing attitude . . . toward genuine discoveries and slight improvements”). 
93 Cole v. Malleable Iron Fittings Co., 70 F.2d 686, 687 (2d Cir. 1934); see also Gen. Motors Corp. 
v. Kesling, 164 F.2d 824, 830 (8th Cir. 1947) (“Broad as is the language of these Claims, their scope 
depends upon the discovery revealed in the explanatory Specifications.”). 
94 See Lutz, supra note 56, at 474. 
95 See Paeco, Inc. v. Applied Moldings, Inc., 562 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1977) (“Where the 
language of a patent claim is clear, the court need not—and may not —go beyond the claim to the 
specification.”); Maclaren v. B-I-W Grp. Inc., 535 F.2d 1367, 1372 (2d Cir. 1976) (declaring the 
claim’s role in defining patent scope as “fundamental”); Golden, supra note 91, at 360–61. 
96 See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206. 
97 See Lutz, supra note 56, at 470 (“After 1870 patentees resorted to actions at law with decreasing 
frequency until finally the jurisdiction of equity over infringement suits became for all practical 
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percentage of jury trials by subject matter were compiled by the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, only 2.5% of patent 
trials were heard by juries.98 The percentage of patent jury trials remained 
low—just a few per year—and never exceeded 10% until the mid-1970s.99 
As reflected in Figure 1, patent jury trials grew steadily beginning in 
the mid-1970s.100 The reasons for preferring trial by jury included speedier 
decisions,101 jurors’ willingness to accord greater significance to a patent’s 
presumption of validity, dispensing with post-trial briefs and proposed 
findings, greater emphasis on excluding inadmissible evidence, and 
possibly appellate courts’ reluctance to disturb jury decisions.102 On the 
other side of the balance, juries have less capacity to comprehend complex 
issues in patent trials, jury trials can be more time-consuming, reversals of 
jury trials usually require new trials (whereas a judge can merely alter 
findings), and a patentee’s request for a jury trial could be perceived as a 
sign of a weak patent.103 
 
purposes exclusive. This development gave to the equity judges full power of interpreting the patent 
instrument.”); Gary M. Ropski, Constitutional and Procedural Aspects of the Use of Juries in Patent 
Litigation (Part I), 58 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 609, 609–10 (1976) (speculating that patent trial attorneys 
“believed that the fantastic pace of technological development began to exceed the ability of the lay 
juror in an action at law to comprehend many inventions”). 
98 See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS 109 tbl.8 (1941). 
99 See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black 
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 366–67 & fig.1 (2000). 
100 Figure 1 is compiled from the ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, supra note 98, at 108–09 tbl.8, and later years. The number of 
patent trials per year varied from a high of 201 in 1941 to a low of 56 in 1946. The number has been 
relatively steady at about 100 patent trials per year since 1980. 
101 Judges in bench trials could take months to resolve the matter following the close of evidence, 
whereas jury verdicts are issued within a few days of closing arguments. 
102 See Ropski, supra note 97, at 612–13; see also Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands: Who’s 
Asking?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847, 852 (2002) (noting that juries may be more favorably inclined 
toward patentees, “individuals over large corporations, domestic over foreign” enterprises, and local, in-
state parties over out-of-state companies). 
103 See Ropski, supra note 97, at 612–13. 
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FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE OF PATENT JURY TRIALS 
(1940–2011) 
 
Empirical research validates the instincts of the intrepid trial lawyers 
who ventured into litigating patent cases before juries. Using a database of 
patents litigated from early 1989 through 1996, Professors Allison and 
Lemley found that juries were more likely to favor patentees on patent 
validity—i.e., less likely to second-guess Patent Office decisions—than 
judges.104 They also found that the Federal Circuit overturned jury verdicts 
slightly less frequently than bench trial decisions (13.3% versus 16.2%).105 
Using a database of tried patent cases from 1983 to 1999, then-Professor 
Moore found that juries ruled “for the patent holder more often on validity, 
infringement, and willfulness issues” and awarded higher damages than 
judges.106 
By 1995, approximately 75% of patent cases were tried to juries. In 
most of those cases, trial judges did not construe the patent themselves but 
rather instructed the jury on claim construction.107 One effect of this 
practice was to shroud the jury’s claim construction in the black box of jury 
 
104 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 211–16 (1998). 
105 See id. at 242–43. 
106 See Moore, supra note 99, at 408. 
107 See Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit 
Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1238 (1994). 
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deliberations, making jury patent decisions especially difficult to review. 
This problem precipitated major changes in patent case management. 
B. The Emergence of Modern Claim Construction Standards 
The resurgence of patent jury trials in the 1970s brought the allocation 
of claim construction responsibilities to center stage. During its first decade 
of operation, the Federal Circuit generated two arguably inconsistent lines 
of authority regarding the nature of claim construction determinations. One 
set of cases viewed the interpretation of patent claims as purely a question 
of law and hence outside of the jury’s responsibility.108 Another line of 
cases characterized claim construction as a mixed question of law based on 
underlying factual determinations.109 In this second line of cases, the 
Federal Circuit generally permitted trial judges to instruct the jury on 
standards for claim construction.110 As a result, district courts routinely 
delegated claim construction to the jury.111 This insulated trial verdicts from 
reversal as the Federal Circuit would uphold the determination if 
substantial evidence supported the jury’s claim interpretation in view of the 
sources in the record.112 
In an article published in 1994, Federal Circuit Judge Paul Michel 
expressed that he could not recall a single jury trial “in which the trial 
judge defined the literal scope of the claim for the jury in clear, 
comprehensive, and mandatory instructions.”113 He lamented that “[w]hen 
the court delegates both construction and infringement to the jury’s 
discretion, the jury is free to do almost anything it wishes.”114 Judge Michel 
noted that the Federal Circuit would soon take up the wisdom of this 
approach to construing patent claims in an en banc case. The Markman 
case115 would initiate a jurisprudential roller coaster that continues to this 
day. 
 
108 See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118–22, 1138–40 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (en banc); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1569–71 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 
Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 770–71 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (five-judge panel); SSIH 
Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 376 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (five-judge panel) (resting 
on the authority of Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1853)). 
109 See Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1549 
(Fed. Cir. 1991); Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985); McGill Inc. v. John 
Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 671–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
110 See Snellman v. Ricoh Co., 862 F.2d 283, 287–88 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Vieau v. Japax, Inc., 823 
F.2d 1510, 1515–17 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Data Line Corp. v. Micro Techs., Inc., 813 F.2d 1196, 1200–02 
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (rejecting the argument that the trial court was required to determine the scope and 
construction of the claim). 
111 See Michel, supra note 107. 
112 See Snellman, 862 F.2d at 286; Data Line Corp., 813 F.2d at 1200; Vieau, 823 F.2d at 1515. 
113 See Michel, supra note 107. 
114 See id. at 1239. 
115 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 
370 (1996). 
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1. The Markman Crossroads: Claim Construction Is a Matter 
“Exclusively Within the Province of the Court.”—In Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, the jury found infringement of a patent for an 
“Inventory Control and Reporting System for Drycleaning Stores” after 
hearing expert testimony about the meaning of the term “inventory” as used 
in the patent claim.116 On post-trial motions, the judge overturned the jury’s 
verdict, explaining that the expert’s testimony regarding the definition of 
“inventory” conflicted with “the ordinary and customary meaning of [this 
term], as well as the obvious meaning intended by the patentee, determined 
from the specifications, the drawings and the file histories of the original 
patent and the patent-in-suit.”117 In upholding the district court’s judgment, 
a majority of the Federal Circuit sitting en banc concluded that the 
construction of patent claims is properly “a matter of law” that should not 
be given to the jury because of the “fundamental principle of American law 
that ‘the construction of a written evidence is exclusively with the 
court.’”118 The court grounded its determination on its reading of Supreme 
Court precedents and authorities dating back to the nineteenth century and 
patent law’s notice function: “[I]t is only fair (and statutorily required) that 
competitors be able to ascertain to a reasonable degree the scope of the 
patentee’s right to exclude.”119 The majority concluded that “[b]ecause 
claim construction is a matter of law, the construction given the claims is 
reviewed de novo on appeal.”120 
The majority opinion noted that a district court could, “in its 
discretion, receive extrinsic evidence in order ‘to aid the court in coming to 
a correct conclusion’ as to the ‘true meaning of the language employed’ in 
the patent.”121 Nonetheless, it emphasized that while such evidence can be 
used “for the court’s understanding of the patent,” it may not be used “for 
the purpose of varying or contradicting the terms of the claims.”122 In an 
effort to defeat Markman’s Seventh Amendment challenge, the majority 
masked the inherent factual nature of claim construction in the context of 
controverted extrinsic evidence in instructing that although the trial judge 
may use 
certain extrinsic evidence that the court finds helpful and reject[] other 
evidence as unhelpful, and resolv[e] disputes en route to pronouncing the 
meaning of claim language as a matter of law based on the patent documents 
themselves, the court is not crediting certain evidence over other evidence or 
making factual evidentiary findings. Rather, the court is looking to the 
 
116 Id. at 973. 
117 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1537 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
118 Markman, 52 F.3d at 978 (quoting Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 180, 186 (1805)). 
119 Id. at 978–79. 
120 Id. at 979. 
121 Id. at 980 (quoting Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 546 (1871)). 
122 Id. at 981. 
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extrinsic evidence to assist in its construction of the written document, a task 
it is required to perform.123 
This self-contradictory statement—using some extrinsic evidence and 
rejecting other extrinsic evidence but not crediting evidence or making 
factual evidentiary findings—generated vehement responses from Judges 
Mayer and Newman. Judge Mayer accused the majority of “jettison[ing] 
more than two hundred years of jurisprudence and eviscerat[ing] the role of 
the jury preserved by the Seventh Amendment.”124 He emphasized the need 
to evaluate claims from the standpoint of the skilled artisan, which 
naturally brings extrinsic evidence into play.125 Where such evidence is 
contested, claim construction requires fact-finding to resolve the 
controversy.126 
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Federal Circuit’s 
determination that “the construction of a patent, including terms of art 
within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.”127 It did so, 
however, in a manner that sidestepped the standard of appellate review, 
focusing instead on whether the right to a jury trial under the Seventh 
Amendment mandates that the jury decide factual disputes arising in patent 
claim construction. The Court applied its “historical test”128—determining 
first whether the cause of action (patent infringement) was tried at law at 
the nation’s founding (or was analogous to one that was), and if so, whether 
“the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve the 
substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791.”129 
The Court characterized the “construing a term of art following receipt 
of evidence” as a “mongrel practice,”130 “fall[ing] somewhere between a 
pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact”131 without an “exact 
antecedent” in 1791.132 It recognized that patent claims had not yet taken 
root in British and American patent practice, finding the closest analogue to 
claim construction to be interpretation of patent specifications for which 
“the mere smattering of patent cases that we have from this period shows 
no established jury practice sufficient to support an argument by analogy 
that today’s construction of a claim should be a guaranteed jury issue.”133 
 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
125 See id. at 991. 
126 See id. 
127 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 
128 Id. at 376 (quoting Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 
57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 640 (1973)). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 378. 
131 Id. at 388 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). 
132 Id. at 378. 
133 Id. at 379–80 (footnote omitted). 
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Lacking evidence of common law practice allocating interpretation of 
patents to the jury, the Court turned to “the relative interpretive skills of 
judges and juries and the statutory policies that ought to be furthered by the 
allocation.”134 Applying a functional analysis, the Court came down firmly 
on the side of allocating claim construction to the trial judge: 
 The construction of written instruments is one of those things that judges 
often do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by training in 
exegesis. Patent construction in particular “is a special occupation, requiring, 
like all others, special training and practice. The judge, from his training and 
discipline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation to such instruments 
than a jury; and he is, therefore, more likely to be right, in performing such a 
duty, than a jury can be expected to be.”135 
The Court also noted “the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a 
given patent as an independent reason to allocate all issues of construction 
to the court,” emphasizing the public notice function.136 
In a critical passage bearing on the standard of appellate review, the 
Court noted that: 
It is, of course, true that credibility judgments have to be made about the 
experts who testify in patent cases, and in theory there could be a case in 
which a simple credibility judgment would suffice to choose between experts 
whose testimony was equally consistent with a patent’s internal logic. But our 
own experience with document construction leaves us doubtful that trial 
courts will run into many cases like that. In the main, we expect, any 
credibility determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily 
sophisticated analysis of the whole document, required by the standard 
construction rule that a term can be defined only in a way that comports with 
the instrument as a whole. Thus, in these cases a jury’s capabilities to evaluate 
demeanor, to sense the “mainsprings of human conduct,” or to reflect 
community standards, are much less significant than a trained ability to 
evaluate the testimony in relation to the overall structure of the patent. The 
decisionmaker vested with the task of construing the patent is in the better 
position to ascertain whether an expert’s proposed definition fully comports 
with the specification and claims and so will preserve the patent’s internal 
coherence. We accordingly think there is sufficient reason to treat construction 
of terms of art like many other responsibilities that we cede to a judge in the 
normal course of trial, notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings.137 
 
134 Id. at 384. 
135 Id. at 388–89 (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No. 
10,740)). 
136 Id. at 390. 
137 Id. at 389–90 (citations omitted). 
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Unlike the Federal Circuit’s Markman decision,138 the Supreme Court 
avoided characterizing patent claim construction as a “matter of law.” 
Rather, consistent with the “mongrel” characterization of claim 
construction, the Supreme Court phrased claim construction as a matter 
“exclusively within the province of the court.”139 
The Markman decision revolutionized patent case management. Trial 
judges immediately began experimenting with different procedures for 
construing patent claims.140 Within a short time, the concept of the 
“Markman hearing” became established and widely used as a pretrial 
proceeding to construe patent claims. Holding this hearing in advance of 
trial promoted settlement, aided in the development of expert reports, and 
provided a basis for summary judgment.141 
2. Post-Markman Confusion Regarding the Nature of Claim 
Construction Determinations and the Standard of Appellate 
Review.—Barely three months after the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Markman, the Federal Circuit confronted the role of fact-finding in claim 
construction in its Vitronics decision.142 The Federal Circuit set forth a 
claim construction hierarchy in which courts look first to the intrinsic 
evidence: the claims themselves, the specification, and the prosecution 
history, in that order.143 The court noted that “[i]n most situations, an 
analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a 
disputed claim term. In such circumstances, it is improper to rely on 
extrinsic evidence.”144 The court cited to its en banc Markman opinion for 
the proposition that “where the public record unambiguously describes the 
scope of the patented invention, reliance on any extrinsic evidence is 
improper” and warned that “[a]llowing the public record to be altered or 
changed by extrinsic evidence introduced at trial, such as expert testimony, 
would make this right meaningless.”145 Consistent with that approach, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that the district court improperly relied upon 
extrinsic evidence “to vary or contradict the manifest meaning of the 
claims.”146 The Federal Circuit went further, however, in stating that 
“opinion testimony on claim construction should be treated with the utmost 
 
138 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 
517 U.S. 370; see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(characterizing claim construction as a “pure issue of law”). 
139 Markman, 517 U.S. at 372, 378. 
140 See MENELL, supra note 17. 
141 See id. chs. 2, 5, 6, 7. 
142 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
143 See id. at 1582–83. 
144 Id. at 1583. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 1585. 
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caution, for it is no better than opinion testimony on the meaning of 
statutory terms.”147 
In so doing, the court rekindled the self-contradictory statement in its 
majority opinion in Markman. District courts could rely on expert 
testimony to “understand” the underlying technology but not to reach the 
“proper construction” unless “the patent documents, taken as a whole, are 
insufficient to enable the court to construe disputed claim terms.”148 This 
cautionary language sought to bolster the questionable notion that claim 
construction was a pure question of law—a search within the documentary 
record—and warned district courts away from hearing from persons skilled 
in the art. It diverged from the Supreme Court’s characterization of claim 
construction as a “mongrel practice” and its invocation of historical sources 
recognizing the need and value for trial courts to consider extrinsic 
evidence in determining the meaning of patent claims’ terms to skilled 
artisans.149 
The Vitronics opinion led district judges away from the use of and 
reliance on extrinsic evidence.150 Notwithstanding that few district judges 
possess scientific or engineering training or clerks with such backgrounds, 
they were expected to master the technological arts to which a patent 
pertained as of the time the invention was made without reliance on 
experts. Even when they opted for a technology tutorial, trial judges would 
do so without putting the evidence on the record. They downplayed or 
omitted the experts’ opinions and credibility assessments in their claim 
construction decisions.151 Trial judges perceived that “fact-finding” as part 
of the Markman process risked running afoul of the Vitronics dictum—that 
instances in which the “patent documents, taken as a whole, are insufficient 
to enable the court to construe disputed claim terms . . . will rarely, if ever, 
occur”152—whereas opaque constructions referencing only intrinsic 
 
147 Id. 
148 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
149 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378–90 (1996). 
150 See O’Malley et al., supra note 8, at 683 (noting that some judges believe that “Vitronics says I 
cannot listen to an expert, and that is what I think the law is”) (remarks of Judge O’Malley). 
151 See Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329, 333 n.7 (D. Del. 1995) 
(Schwartz, J.) (“When two experts testify differently as to the meaning of a technical term, and the 
court embraces the view of one, the other, or neither while construing a patent claim as a matter of law, 
the court has engaged in weighing evidence and making credibility determinations. . . . But when the 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals states that the trial court does not do something that the trial court 
does and must do to perform the judicial function, that court knowingly enters a land of sophistry and 
fiction.”); In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (Easterbrook, J., sitting by designation) (“[J]udges should not pretend that all nominally 
‘legal’ issues may be resolved without reference to facts. . . . What seems clear to a judge may read 
otherwise to [one skilled in the art].”). 
152 See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1585. Although the Federal Circuit later clarified that its Vitronics 
decision did not bar use of extrinsic evidence to understand the technology and was merely a warning 
not to contradict clear intrinsic evidence, see Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 182 F.3d 
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evidence stood a better chance of affirmance. Following the frustrating 
experience of conducting a Markman hearing without the ability to make 
factual determinations, district courts faced the prospect of de novo review 
by the Federal Circuit. 
This predicament produced an alarming reversal rate for district court 
claim construction rulings. Then-Professor (now-Federal Circuit Judge) 
Kimberly Moore discovered that in the eight years following the Supreme 
Court’s Markman decision, the Federal Circuit found errors in 34.5% of the 
claim construction terms that it reviewed and at least one claim 
construction error in 37.5% of all claim construction appeals.153 Because 
claim construction errors often result in district court decisions being 
reversed or vacated,154 the ramifications for district judges and litigants are 
significant. 
This pattern demoralized federal district judges.155 One district judge, 
reflecting on his success on appeal, stated: 
I have had nine of my cases appealed to the Federal Circuit. I have been 
affirmed in one. I have been affirmed in part in one. And I have been reversed 
in seven. That does not relieve me—and I am not proud of that. I don’t throw 
that out as a challenge to anyone—far from it. My duty is to predict what they 
are going to say and follow the law. But I haven’t had noticeable success in 
dealing with these matters.156 
Division among Federal Circuit judges regarding the appropriate 
standard of appellate review continued to surface following the Supreme 
Court’s Markman decision.157 Judge Mayer, in particular, continued to press 
 
1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999), district judges continued to downplay their use of and reliance upon 
extrinsic evidence in construing patent claims. 
153 See Moore, supra note 7, at 239. 
154 See Moore, supra note 1, at 4, 13 (reporting, for the five years following the Supreme Court’s 
Markman decision, that the Federal Circuit reversed or vacated the district court’s decision in 81% of 
cases in which it found a claim construction error). 
155 See Mazumdar, supra note 8 (District Judge Marsha Penchman noted: “[When y]ou get 
reversed 37 percent of [the] time [on claim construction]; you might as well throw darts.”); Moore, 
supra note 99, at 396 (Judge Samuel B. Kent of the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, 
commented at a summary judgment proceeding: “Frankly, I don’t know why I’m so excited about 
trying to bring this thing [patent suit] to closure. It goes to the Federal Circuit afterwards. You know, 
it’s hard to deal with things that are ultimately resolved by people wearing propeller hats. But we’ll just 
have to see what happens when we give it to them. I could say that with impunity because they’ve 
reversed everything I’ve ever done, so I expect fully they’ll reverse this, too.”); O’Malley et al., supra 
note 8 (quoting Judge Patti Saris of the U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts, as stating that 
“the high reversal rate demoralizes many federal district court judges”). 
156 Honorable William G. Young & R. Carl Moy, Panel Discussion, High Technology Law in the 
Twenty-First Century: Second Annual High Technology Law Conference, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. 
REV. 13, 19 (1997) (citation omitted). 
157 Compare Metaullics Sys. Co. v. Cooper, 100 F.3d 938, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (characterizing 
claim construction as a “mixed question of law and fact”), abrogated by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), with id. at 940 (Lourie, J., concurring) (noting that the 
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the view that the Federal Circuit owed deference to district court claim 
construction rulings,158 eventually precipitating the Federal Circuit’s en 
banc review of the appellate claim construction standard in Cybor Corp. v. 
FAS Technologies, Inc.159 
In a sharply divided decision, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that claim 
construction is purely a legal issue, subject to de novo appellate review. 
Writing for the majority, Judge Archer read the Supreme Court’s Markman 
decision to classify claim constructing as “a legal question to be decided by 
the judge.”160 He emphasized the Supreme Court’s concern for certainty 
and national uniformity161 and bolstered his conclusion by negative 
implication: “Nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion supports the view 
that the Court endorsed a silent, third option—that claim construction may 
involve subsidiary or underlying questions of fact.”162 Judge Archer 
downplayed the Supreme Court’s characterization of claim construction as 
a “mongrel practice”163 “fall[ing] somewhere between a pristine legal 
standard and a simple historical fact,”164 as merely “prefatory comments.”165 
He latched on to the Supreme Court’s ambiguous observation that 
 
Supreme Court did not overrule the de novo review standard); see also J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. Paste & 
Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“This court’s role in reviewing 
claim meanings discerned by the district courts calls for modesty and restraint—born not of timidity, 
but of recognition of the limits inherent in appellate review.”); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1555–56 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that the district court correctly consulted 
extrinsic evidence and that the trial court is in the best position to evaluate this extrinsic evidence), 
abrogated by Cybor, 138 F.3d 1448; id. at 1563 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (arguing that extrinsic evidence 
should not be used to contradict the specification and that the “appellate court is equally well suited to 
read the specification” as the district court). 
158 See Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578, 1586 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Mayer, J., concurring) 
(arguing that “this court may be required to give due deference to the trial court’s factual findings” 
(citing Metaullics Sys. Co., 100 F.3d at 939)); CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 120 F.3d 1260, 
1261–62 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Mayer, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing and suggestion for rehearing 
en banc) (contending that “[t]he Supreme Court in no way suggested that, where the district court found 
facts about the prior art or the skill and understanding of an artisan, the appellate panel could disregard 
these findings upon de novo review” and asserting that where a question of law is “informed by the 
resolution of factual disputes, we must separate the two and give each its proper measure of respect”); 
Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc., 132 F.3d 1437, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Mayer, J., concurring) 
(stating that “when, as here, there is vigorous dispute and conflicting evidence about the meaning of a 
term, the trial judge has to make findings of fact as he decides the meaning to ascribe to the patent”), 
abrogated by Cybor, 138 F.3d 1448. 
159 138 F.3d 1448; Donald R. Dunner & Howard A. Kwon, Cybor Corp v. FAS Technologies: The 
Final Say on Appellate Review of Claim Construction?, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 481, 
489–90 (1998) (noting the “extraordinary” sua sponte order to hear the Cybor case en banc before a 
panel decision issued). 
160 Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455. 
161 See id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996)). 
162 Id. 
163 Markman, 517 U.S. at 378. 
164 Id. at 388 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). 
165 See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455. 
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while credibility determinations theoretically could play a role in claim 
construction, the chance of such an occurrence is “doubtful” and that “any 
credibility determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily 
sophisticated analysis of the whole document, required by the standard 
construction rule that a term can be defined only in a way that comports with 
the instrument as a whole.”166 
Chief Judge Mayer, joined by Judge Newman, reiterated his 
longstanding view that the Federal Circuit must defer to the trial judge on 
the resolution of disputed factual issues that arise in claim construction.167 
Judge Rader dissented from the majority’s pronouncements on claim 
interpretation, noting that the Federal Circuit had been so preoccupied with 
the applicability of the Seventh Amendment to claim construction that it 
had never squarely confronted the standard of appellate review of judge-
determined claim construction rulings.168 He openly questioned the 
ramifications of the court’s claim construction guidance for transparency in 
the trial court’s record and reasoning, worrying that the de novo standard 
would discourage and delay settlement.169 
The Cybor decision did little to quell concerns about de novo appellate 
review of claim construction rulings.170 Just as the decision came down, the 
wave of software and business method patent cases growing out of the dot-
com bubble began reaching the district courts.171 The continued high 
reversal rate172 in conjunction with the Federal Circuit’s unwillingness to 
grant interlocutory review of claim construction rulings fueled criticism of 
the patent litigation system.173 The National Academies of Science and the 
 
166 Id. at 1455–56 (quoting Markman, 517 U.S. at 389). This explanation, however, overlooks a 
critical passage in the Supreme Court’s Markman decision. See infra Part IV.A; Peter S. Menell, 
Reconsidering Cybor: A Hybrid Standard of Appellate Review of Patent Claim Construction Rulings 
10–13 (UC Berkeley Sch. of Law Research Paper July 5, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2289343 (reproducing Brief of Professor Peter S. Menell as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Plaintiff–Appellee, Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics North 
America Corp., 500 F. App’x 951 (Fed. Cir. July 1, 2013) (No. 2012-1014)). 
167 See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1465–66 (Mayer, C.J., joined by Newman, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
168 See id. at 1473–74 (Rader, J., dissenting in part, concurring in the judgment, and joining part IV 
of the en banc opinion). 
169 See id. at 1475–76. 
170 See, e.g., Dunner & Kwon, supra note 159, at 497 (arguing that the de novo standard “may 
undermine the judicial role” in patent litigation and urging some deference to district courts). 
171 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 28–32 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) (noting that a surge in patenting led to a doubling 
of “the number of patent lawsuits settled in or disposed by federal district courts” “between 1998 and 
2001, from 1,200 to nearly 2,400”). 
172 See Chu, supra note 7 (reporting a 44% reversal rate); Moore, supra note 7, at 239 (reporting a 
37.5% reversal rate); Zidel, supra note 7, at 741–42 (reporting a 41.5% reversal rate). 
173 See Mazumdar, supra note 8; O’Malley et al., supra note 8, at 681–82 (remarks of Judge Patti 
Saris). 
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Federal Trade Commission undertook comprehensive studies of the 
problems plaguing the patent system.174 
The Federal Circuit continued to tinker with presumptions and the 
hierarchy of sources in an effort to make claim construction more 
predictable. In Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,175 another 
panel sought to further clarify the claim construction framework by 
recognizing dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises as “particularly useful 
resources to assist the court in determining the ordinary and customary 
meanings of claim terms” due to their public availability and objectivity.176 
The court noted that, unlike expert testimony, these reference sources are 
not “colored by the motives of the parties” or “inspired by litigation.”177 
“Indeed, these materials may be the most meaningful sources of 
information to aid judges in better understanding both the technology and 
the terminology used by those skilled in the art to describe the 
technology.”178 
3. Omnibus Reconsideration of Claim Construction: Phillips v. 
AWH Corp.—The doctrinal adjustments following Cybor 
produced greater confusion179 and higher reversal rates.180 In an effort to 
address the inconsistency across its own decisions and quell the widespread 
dissatisfaction among district judges and practitioners with its claim 
construction jurisprudence, the Federal Circuit granted en banc review in 
Phillips v. AWH Corp., a case appropriately struggling to interpret the term 
“baffles.”181 The court issued an unusual order182 inviting briefs directed to 
 
174 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION 
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 
171. 
175 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002), overruled by Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (en banc). 
176 See id. at 1202. The Texas Digital court drew in part on the statement in Vitronics Corp. v. 
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996), that “technical treatises and 
dictionaries . . . are worthy of special note.” Id. 
177 Id. at 1203. 
178 Id. 
179 See Ben Hattenbach, Chickens, Eggs and Other Impediments to Escalating Reliance on 
Dictionaries in Patent Claim Construction, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 181, 189–90 (2003) 
(asserting that the use of dictionaries makes the claim interpretation process unpredictable); Jennifer R. 
Johnson, Out of Context: Texas Digital, The Indefiniteness of Language, and the Search for Ordinary 
Meaning, 44 IDEA 521, 540–41 (2004); see also O’Malley et al., supra note 8 (presenting a colloquy 
among three leading district court jurists with extensive experience with patent cases); accord SciMed 
Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Dyk, J., 
concurring) (“Until we provide better [claim construction] guidance, I fear that the lower courts and 
litigants will remain confused.”). 
180 See Moore, supra note 7 (reporting a 34.5% reversal rate); see also Schwartz, supra note 6, at 
240 (finding a similar reversal rate). 
181 415 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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seven detailed questions, ranging from the role of evidentiary sources 
(dictionaries, specification, prosecution history, and expert testimony) to 
the standard of appellate review.183 
With input from over thirty amicus briefs as well as briefs from the 
parties, the resulting decision affirmed the Federal Circuit’s Markman 
framework whereby claims are to be given their ordinary and customary 
meaning from the perspective of one skilled in the art.184 The majority 
emphasized the role of intrinsic evidence and especially of the specification 
in construing claims, observing that the specification is “[u]sually . . . 
dispositive” and “the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed 
term.”185 
The majority authorized trial courts to consider extrinsic evidence, but 
deemed it “less significant” and “less reliable” in determining the scope of 
claim terms.186 It recognized that expert testimony can be useful “to provide 
background on the technology at issue, to explain how an invention works, 
to ensure that the court’s understanding of the technical aspects of the 
patent is consistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or to establish 
that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular meaning 
in the pertinent field,” but that “conclusory, unsupported assertions by 
experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful to a court.”187 
While continuing to recognize the objectivity of dictionaries, the 
majority nonetheless backed away from Texas Digital’s presumption that a 
dictionary meaning would apply unless the term in question was explicitly 
defined in the specification or where the intrinsic evidence disavowed or 
disclaimed such meaning.188 Such a methodology, in the court’s view, 
improperly “focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of words rather 
than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the patent.”189 
The court emphasized the specification as the primary source for 
interpreting patent claims, but acknowledged that “there is no magic 
formula or catechism” or “rigid algorithm” for conducting claim 
 
182 See Ryan Vacca, Acting Like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 MO. 
L. REV. 733, 740–42, 747 (2011) (characterizing the en banc order in Phillips as unusual in the scope of 
the questions posed and the process as akin to a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking under the 
Administrative Procedure Act). 
183 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam); see 
also id. at 1384 (Rader, J., concurring) (inviting comment on an additional set of questions); id. (Mayer, 
C.J., dissenting) (calling for the court to reconsider its en banc holdings in Markman and Cybor that 
claim construction is a pure question of law subject to de novo review). 
184 See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17. 
185 Id. at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 
1996)). 
186 See id. at 1317–18. 
187 See id. at 1318. 
188 See id. at 1320–21. 
189 See id. at 1321. 
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construction.190 Trial judges may consider any particular source of evidence 
in whatever sequence they deem appropriate so long as they do not 
“contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic 
evidence.”191 
The majority declined to revisit the scope of appellate review of claim 
construction rulings, noting that while it had considered the matter, it 
“decided not to address [the] issue at this time,” leaving Cybor’s de novo 
standard in place.192 Nonetheless, lingering division among the members of 
the court remained. While adhering to the view that claim construction is a 
question of law subject to de novo review, Judge Lourie, joined by Judge 
Newman, wrote separately to urge his colleagues “to lean toward 
affirmance of a claim construction in the absence of a strong conviction of 
error.”193 In dissent, Judge Mayer, joined by Judge Newman, reiterated his 
continued frustration with “the futility, indeed the absurdity, of this court’s 
persistence in adhering to the falsehood that claim construction is a matter 
of law devoid of any factual component.”194 
4. Continuing Division over the De Novo Standard.—The division 
over the standard of appellate review has periodically resurfaced during the 
past several years.195 In 2012, the Supreme Court indicated a willingness to 
revisit the topic. In reviewing a petition for certiorari challenging the 
Federal Circuit’s de novo standard, the Court requested the views of the 
U.S. Solicitor General.196 The Solicitor General recognized that “[t]he 
question whether deferential review is appropriate [when reviewing factual 
determinations in claim construction] is of substantial and ongoing 
importance in patent law.”197 However, the Solicitor General ultimately 
urged the Court to decline the writ of certiorari because the district court 
had not made “any factual findings or resolve[d] any evidentiary disputes 
in interpreting the patent claims at issue here.”198 The Court denied 
 
190 See id. at 1324. 
191 See id. 
192 See id. at 1328. 
193 See id. at 1330 (Lourie, J., joined by Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
194 See id. (Mayer, J., joined by Newman, J., dissenting). 
195 See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(Moore, J., joined by Rader, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
833 (2013) (mem.); Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
id. at 1363–64 (Clark, District Judge (E.D. Tex.), concurring); Medegen MMS, Inc. v. ICU Med., Inc., 
317 F. App’x 982, 988–91 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Walker, Chief District Judge (N.D. Cal.), dissenting) 
(urging greater deference); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (Moore, C.J., joined by Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
196 Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 133 S. Ct. 72 (2012) (mem.) (inviting the 
Solicitor General to file a brief). 
197 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Retractable Techs., 133 S. Ct. 833 (No. 11-
1154), 2012 WL 5940288, at *7. 
198 Id. at *8. 
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certiorari in January 2013.199 Just a few months later, the Federal Circuit 
granted en banc review of the standard of appellate review of claim 
construction rulings in Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics 
North America Corp.200 
II. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: THE IMPACT OF PHILLIPS V. AWH 
In order to analyze the ongoing controversy over claim construction 
review, we developed a comprehensive database of appellate claim 
construction decisions from 2000 through 2011. This Part presents the 
results of our empirical study. Section A provides a brief review of 
previous empirical studies of patent claim construction. Then, section B 
describes the design of our study. Section C presents our results, including 
the overall trend in reversal rates, the evidentiary sources referenced in 
Federal Circuit decisions, judge-specific voting patterns, technology-
specific patterns, the rate of summary affirmance, and the role of the skilled 
artisan perspective. Finally, section C interprets our principal finding—that 
claim construction reversal rates have dropped significantly since Phillips. 
We find that the drop in reversal rates is principally attributable to the 
emergence of informal deference to district court claim construction 
decisions at the Federal Circuit. 
A. Previous Empirical Studies 
The vicissitudes of the Federal Circuit’s claim construction 
jurisprudence have resulted in numerous empirical studies. Prior to 
Phillips, the most comprehensive study of claim construction was 
conducted by then-Professor Kimberly Moore.201 In two influential papers, 
Moore studied all precedential, nonprecedential, and summary affirmance 
claim construction decisions at the Federal Circuit from April 23, 1996 (the 
date of the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman), through 2003.202 She 
found that the Federal Circuit reversed claim construction decisions on 
34.5% of appealed claim terms,203 a rate that resulted in 29.7% of all 
appeals involving a question of claim construction being remanded or 
reversed.204 Moore surmised that the high rate of reversal was due to the 
 
199 See Retractable Techs., 133 S. Ct. 833, denying cert. to 653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
200 500 F. App’x 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 
201 Moore, supra note 7. 
202 Moore, supra note 1, at 8–9; Moore, supra note 7, at 239. 
203 Moore, supra note 7, at 239. Judge Moore calculated reversal rates in three manners, which we 
discuss infra note 244. She found that 37.5% of cases involved the reversal of at least one term. 
204 Id. A finding of a higher reversal rate by term than by case is explained by the fact that a claim 
construction case contains at least one appealed claim term, but potentially more than one. Thus, a case 
that has ten terms, nine of which are affirmed, one of which is reversed, would have a 10% reversal rate 
by term, but count as one case reversed. If the case were remanded or reversed (as it likely would be 
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Federal Circuit’s muddled claim construction jurisprudence.205 Several 
follow-on studies substantiated Moore’s findings of high reversal rates pre-
Phillips.206 
Professors R. Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge’s empirical work 
focused on the methodological split among Federal Circuit judges.207 Their 
study grouped judges into three categories: (1) proceduralists, who give 
primary weight to the claim language (and the ordinary meaning, often 
derived from dictionaries); (2) holistics, who interpret patent claim terms 
using an open-ended methodology drawing upon the full range of 
interpretive tools—claim language, specification, prosecution history, 
dictionaries, and expert testimony; or (3) “swing” judges, a middle group 
that does not subscribe to either the procedural or holistic methodology.208 
They found that claim construction appeal outcomes were highly dependent 
on the composition of the appellate panel,209 which substantially explained 
both pre- and post-Phillips appellate decisions.210 Wagner and Petherbridge 
could not confirm that Phillips had a “significant impact on the stability 
and predictability” of claim construction.211 
Professor David Schwartz has examined whether district court judges 
improve their performance of claim construction over time.212 He found no 
evidence that district judge reversal rates dropped as judges gained 
experience.213 Schwartz suggested three possible explanations for his 
 
unless other issues such as infringement allow for affirmance), the case would be coded as one reversed 
case. 
205 Id. at 247. 
206 See Bender, supra note 6, at 203, 207 (finding a 40% reversal rate from 1996 to 2000); Chu, 
supra note 7, at 1092, 1104 (finding a 44% reversal rate from 1998 to 2000); Zidel, supra note 7, at 
741–42 (finding a 41.5% reversal rate in 2001). Many of these studies found the reversal rate to be 
much higher than that reported by Judge Moore. The higher rates in these later studies were due to the 
omission in the follow-on studies of summary affirmance cases. See Moore, supra note 7, at 235–38 & 
nn.15–17. A significant minority of claim construction appeals are decided through the Rule 36 process. 
For example, Judge Moore’s study found 104 relevant Rule 36 cases over the time period analyzed. 
Over that same span, there were 651 relevant opinion cases. Id. at 239 & n.31. Failing to include such 
cases overestimates the reversal rate because all Rule 36 decisions are affirmances. 
207 Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 1110–11. 
208 Id. at 1111 & n.19, 1112. 
209 Id. at 1112, 1158–59. 
210 Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 11 (manuscript at 133–38). 
211 Id. (manuscript at 142). 
212 Schwartz, supra note 6, at 225. Schwartz’s study examined every case between April 24, 1996, 
and June 30, 2007, in which a construed claim term was appealed. Id. at 238. 
213 Id. at 267. Professor Schwartz’s study included all appellate claim construction decisions: 
precedential, nonprecedential, and Rule 36. Id. at 238. His study’s reversal rate is similar to that of 
Judge Moore’s study: 33.9% of terms were wrongly construed in Schwartz’s study compared to 34.5% 
of terms in Judge Moore’s study. Id. at 240. Schwartz’s study includes nearly two years of cases 
decided after Phillips whereas Moore’s study preceded Phillips. Schwartz does not indicate or suggest 
that either the reversal rate or judges’ ability to “learn” how to construe claims has improved after 
Phillips. 
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findings: (1) inherent indeterminacy in claim construction, (2) failure of the 
Federal Circuit to properly instruct district courts, or (3) failure of district 
court judges to learn how to perform claim construction.214 Schwartz 
concluded by calling for further study of the “cause” of the high claim 
construction reversal rate.215 Schwartz has also found that the reversal rate 
of claim construction cases in the pre-Markman era was much lower than 
that of the post-Markman era.216 
B. Our Study 
1. Design and Methodology.—The database that we created for this 
study contains every appellate claim construction decision issued between 
January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2011. It includes all precedential, 
nonprecedential, and summary affirmance (Rule 36) opinions.217 The 
database covers 1930 individual claim terms from 1067 cases. Some cases 
in the database involve a single disputed claim term, while some involve 
multiple terms.218 
In order to identify relevant cases, we performed an overinclusive 
search on LexisNexis to capture all patent-related appeals in which the 
Federal Circuit discussed the proper construction, definition, or 
interpretation of claim language. The results of that search were then 
examined by human coders to determine whether the cases were relevant to 
our study. A case was deemed relevant if the Federal Circuit reviewed the 
district court’s construction of a claim term.219 
Rule 36 of the Federal Circuit’s Rules permits the court to enter a 
judgment of affirmance without written opinion in certain cases.220 Because 
summary affirmances lack a written opinion, we established a separate 
protocol for determining relevancy of such cases. A LexisNexis search was 
performed that returned all patent cases that resulted in a Rule 36 
affirmance from 2000 to 2011. Human coders then examined the appellate 
briefs of each case to determine relevancy. A Rule 36 case was deemed 
relevant for the study if the briefs challenged the district court’s 
 
214 Id. at 267. 
215 Id. at 267 n.219. 
216 David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073, 1093 fig.A 
(2010) (finding a 20.8% reversal rate pre-Markman). 
217 For a critique of studies that fail to include Rule 36 cases, see Moore, supra note 7, at 234–35. 
218 Each term occupies a separate entry in the database. On average, each case contains 1.8 
appealed claim terms. 
219 A few cases involved appeals of the district courts’ failure to construe a claim. In such cases, the 
term was included in the database only if the Federal Circuit directly construed the claim. If the Federal 
Circuit merely reviewed the decision not to construe, the term was not included in the database. 
220 FED. CIR. R. 36. 
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construction of a claim term. Further details on the specifics of relevancy 
determinations can be found in Appendix A.221 
Once we accumulated the relevant cases, we hand coded each case and 
each claim term across three broad categories of information: case data, 
claim term data, and construction evidence. The data are described more 
fully in Appendix A. Of particular relevance for reversal rates, we coded 
each claim term’s final disposition on appeal as either (1) affirmed, 
(2) reversed, or (3) avoided.222 Similarly, each case was coded with a final 
disposition. Rule 36 cases were automatically coded as “affirmed.” 
The time period of our study (2000–2011) was selected for several 
reasons. First, the period provides a balanced frame to evaluate the Federal 
Circuit’s tendencies before and after its Phillips decision. Phillips was 
decided around the midpoint of our study period (July 12, 2005), allowing 
us to compare a large number of appealed claim terms from the five-and-
one-half-year period before Phillips and the six-and-one-half year period 
following Phillips.223 Second, the twelve-year period provides a large 
amount of data sufficient for an empirical assessment of Phillips’s impact. 
Lastly, 2000–2011 represents a relatively stable era for the Federal Circuit. 
Of the eleven judges in active status on January 1, 2000, all but one served 
on the court through the entire period of our study.224 The sole exception, 
Chief Judge Michel, served on active status until his retirement on May 31, 
2010.225 During the time period of our study, six judges were added to the 
Federal Circuit: Judges Dyk, Prost, Moore, O’Malley, Reyna, and 
Wallach.226 The latter three judges have not heard a significant number of 
claim construction cases over the time period of our study.227 The relative 
stability of the court during this time period reduces the likelihood that any 
 
221 David Schwartz has used a similar method to determine relevance to claim construction. See 
Schwartz, supra note 6, at 239. 
222 “Avoided” terms (eighty-five terms total) were not included in the results section of this Article 
because they do not constitute either affirmances or reversals. See Appendix A. 
223 The database includes 1010 claim terms from the period before Phillips and 885 claim terms 
from the period after Phillips. 
224 A number of judges took senior status during the period of our study: Judge Plager (2000), 
Judge Clevenger (Feb. 1, 2006), Judge Schall (Oct. 5, 2009), Judge Mayer (June 30, 2010), and Judge 
Gajarsa (July 31, 2011). See Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 
1003, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Judges, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges (last visited Jan. 13, 2014). All five remained on the court during 
the duration of the time period of our study. 
225 Chief Judge Michel Will Retire on May 31, 2010, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. 
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/index.php?option=com_%20content&view=article&id=3:chief-
judge-michel-will-retire-on-may-31-2010 (last visited Jan. 13, 2014). 
226 Judges, supra note 224. 
227 Judge O’Malley heard ten of the cases that are included in our database; Judge Reyna heard 
seven; Judge Wallach did not hear any. 
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changes that we observe after Phillips were attributable to changes in 
personnel.228 
2. Limitations of the Database.—As with any empirical examination 
of judicial behavior, there are a number of limitations that should be 
acknowledged. First, our dataset is limited to appellate decisions. District 
court judges construe an enormous number of claim terms that are never 
appealed to the Federal Circuit. Our study is not designed to capture those 
unappealed claim terms. It is possible that district courts are much more 
accurate in construing claims than is generally acknowledged and that 
claim construction reversal rates would be lower if every construed term 
were appealed. Our study, however, is not designed to answer the question 
of district court accuracy.229 Rather, it examines appellate behavior and the 
impact of Phillips on that behavior. 
The second potential drawback to our methodology is the selection 
bias inherent in an examination of appellate decisions. Economic theory 
suggests appellate cases represent those cases in which rational actors are 
most likely to disagree on the correct outcome.230 While critics have pointed 
out that actual affirmance rates at appellate courts do not support this 
theory,231 it is undoubtedly true that appealed claim terms, on average, 
represent those claim terms that are most difficult to construe. Again, 
however, our study is not meant to determine the rate of correct claim 
construction. We are concerned only with appellate practice, and thus, 
restricting our study to appealed claim terms provides the best evidence 
from which to make claims about appellate behavior. Furthermore, there 
are good reasons to suspect that the Priest–Klein framework is less 
applicable when examining a subset of appealed issues rather than all 
appealed cases.232 
 
228 An additional benefit of the time period of our study is that, with minor exceptions, all of the 
briefs and opinions needed for our study were accessible through online databases. Only the briefs of 
Rule 36 cases decided between January and May of 2000 were not accessible via LexisNexis or 
Westlaw as of the time of this writing. To determine relevancy and to code these cases, we searched the 
archives at the Federal Circuit library. Our thanks to the excellent librarians at the court. 
229 For a discussion of the value of such district court accuracy, see Moore, supra note 1, at 28–29. 
See also Schwartz, supra note 6, at 226 (noting that the high reversal rate of district court judges’ claim 
construction leads to unpredictability and discourages settlement). 
230 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 4, 16–17 (1984). 
231 See Jason Rantanen, Why Priest–Klein Cannot Apply to Individual Issues in Patent Cases 
(Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-15, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2132810. But see Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining 
Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for 
Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 236–42 (1996) (determining that the Priest–Klein predicted win rate 
of 50% is accurate when the underlying assumptions of their model hold true). 
232 See Rantanen, supra note 231. For a more complete discussion of selection effects in claim 
construction empirical research, see Schwartz, supra note 216, at 1101–07. 
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That is not to say, of course, that our study is immune from concerns 
about the data. If the distribution of appealed cases changed significantly 
near the date of the Phillips decision, we would observe a change in 
reversal rates (or other data) that is, in fact, unrelated to the Phillips 
decision. Appellate courts are incredibly complex institutions; we cannot 
hope to isolate all of the inputs that affect the outcome of any particular 
appeal. We do not suggest that Phillips is the only factor in claim 
construction appeals over the time period of our study. Countless other 
economic, legal, political, and social factors have changed during the 
course of our study. 
Lastly, as with any hand-coded database, there are concerns about the 
quality of the data. We have taken a number of steps to ensure that the 
dataset is reliable. First, we only utilized coders with scientific 
backgrounds. All of the coders participated in a one-semester course about 
claim construction or equivalent training. A coding manual describing the 
coding procedure was created in order to increase reliability. Additionally, 
we double coded many cases in order to test inter-rater agreement. Cohen’s 
Kappa was chosen as the test of inter-rater reliability.233 For the majority of 
coding related in this article, Cohen’s Kappa ranged from 0.845 to 0.978.234 
In general, we found the reliability of the coding system to be high. 
We also compared portions of our dataset with Kimberly Moore’s 
studies to gauge the accuracy of the cases chosen for our study. Moore’s 
studies contain a time period that overlaps with our study (2001–2003).235 
The results from the two studies are very similar: our database contains 603 
terms over that time period, while Moore’s database included 604;236 our 
 
233 Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. 
L. REV. 63, 113–14 (2008) (stating that it is crucial to use a measurement of intercoder reliability, such 
as Cohen’s Kappa). 
234 Cohen’s Kappa ranges from 0 to 1, with numbers near one indicating higher degrees of 
reliability. Id. For claim term outcomes (agree/disagree) our database had a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.940. 
For case relevance, our database had a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.890. For panel composition, our database 
had a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.978. For evidentiary sources, our database had a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.845. 
235 Although Moore’s published studies give only cumulative results, by comparing the results 
from her first study, Moore, supra note 1, at 4, 11–14 (covering 1996–2000), with that of her follow-up 
piece, Moore, supra note 7, at 239–45 (covering 1996–2003), we were able to obtain results from 2001 
to 2003. Her first publication reports a total of 496 terms, see Moore, supra note 1, at 23, while her 
follow-up piece reports 1100 terms, see Moore, supra note 7, at 243–44; thus a total of 604 were 
identified in the interim period of 2001 to 2003. 
236 It should be noted that we did not include all of those 603 claim terms in the results of this 
Article. We choose not to use appeals arising from claim construction decisions at the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office because of the differing standards with which the Patent Office and 
district courts construe claims. See Appendix A for a discussion of the cases we excluded from the final 
results of this Article. 
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data indicate a reversal rate of 39.4% over that period, while Moore finds 
the rate to be 39.7%.237 
C. Empirical Results: Has Claim Construction at the Federal Circuit 
Changed Since Phillips? 
1. Reversal Rates.—Prior to Phillips, the reversal rate of claim 
construction appeals at the Federal Circuit was widely perceived as 
unacceptably high.238 Critics argued that the high reversal rate demonstrated 
that the Federal Circuit was failing to reduce the uncertainty surrounding 
patent rights. Furthermore, the uncertainty involved in the claim 
construction appeal process was frustrating to both district court judges and 
judges on the Federal Circuit.239 Patent holders and technology companies 
also complained about prolonged and increasingly expensive litigation. The 
Phillips decision was in part designed to reduce the reversal rate of claim 
construction appeals at the Federal Circuit.240 
The perception of high reversal rates during the period before Phillips 
is supported by the data. During the five-and-one-half years prior to 
Phillips (January 1, 2000–July 12, 2005), the reversal rate was 37.2% for 
appealed claim terms.241 Measured by cases with at least one erroneously 
construed term, the pre-Phillips reversal rate was 40.6%.242 The result of the 
frequent claim term reversals was that 30.2% of pre-Phillips cases were 
reversed, vacated, or remanded due to an erroneous claim construction at 
the district court level.243 
 
237 We calculated Moore’s reversal rate for 2001 to 2003 as follows. First, we calculated the total 
number of reversed terms from 1996 to 2003. We believe that number is 379 reversed terms (34.5% 
reversal rate for 1100 total terms). See Moore, supra note 7, at 243–44. Second, we found the total 
number of reversed terms from 1996 to 2001: 139 (28% reversal rate for 496 terms). See Moore, supra 
note 1, at 23. Third, by subtracting the number of reversals from 1996 to 2001 from the number of 
reversals from 1996 to 2003, we obtained 240 reversals from 2001 to 2003. Lastly, we divided the 
number of reversals (240) from the total terms reviewed (604) for a 39.7% reversal rate. 
238 See, e.g., Lefstin, supra note 7, at 1033 (“[I]f [claim] interpretation is at the core of patent law, 
there are many who claim that core is now rotten.”); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: 
Dissent, Indeterminacy, and Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1026 n.2 
(2007) (“Claim construction jurisprudence is in disarray. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit reverses trial court claim construction decisions at a worryingly high rate. The 
proportion of Federal Circuit claim construction opinions that include separate concurrences or dissents 
continues to grow.” (quoting Miller, supra note 6, at 177)); Timothy J. Malloy & Patrick V. Bradley, 
Claim Construction: A Plea for Deference, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 191, 191 (2006) (suggesting that claim 
construction “remains as unpredictable as ever”). 
239 Moore, supra note 1, at 29 (“Undoubtedly, with reversal rates so high, district court judges are 
frustrated with the claim construction process.”). 
240 See supra Part I.B. 
241 N = 952 terms. 
242 Two hundred fifteen appealed cases contained erroneous constructions. N = 530 cases. 
243 For other studies calculating reversal rates, see Moore, supra note 7, at 239–45 (finding reversal 
rates between April 1996 and December 2003 of 34.5% on a term-by-term basis, 37.5% on a case-by-
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Our data indicate that the reversal rate of claim construction appeals at 
the Federal Circuit has dropped substantially since Phillips. The reversal 
rate since July 2005 is 24.0% on a term-by-term basis. In that time the 
court has reversed at least one term in 29.5% of appeals, resulting in a 
remand, reversal, or vacation in 23.1% of cases. Table 2 summarizes the 
key statistics, while Table 3 provides year-by-year reversal rates by term.244 
TABLE 2: PRE- AND POST-PHILLIPS REVERSAL RATES (2000–2011)245 
 Pre-Phillips Post-Phillips 
Percentage of terms reversed 37.2% 24.0% 
Percentage of cases with at least one reversed 
claim term 
40.6% 29.5% 
Percentage of cases resulting in remand, 
reversal, or vacation due to claim construction 
error 
30.2% 23.1% 
 
TABLE 3: REVERSAL RATES BY YEAR 
Year Reversal Rate 
2000 24.6% 
2001 36.1% 
2002 40.7% 
2003 39.8% 
2004 44.2% 
2005 31.3% 
 
case basis, and 29.7% on a by-case-impact basis), and Schwartz, supra note 6, at 240 (finding reversal 
rates over the same time period of 33.9% on a term-by-term basis, 38.8% on a case-by-case basis, and 
29.3% on a by-case-impact basis). The higher reversal rates in our study are likely due to the different 
time periods studied. Neither Moore nor Schwartz included 2004 and the six months of 2005 in their 
calculations, eighteen months that saw an unusually high reversal rate. Over 45% of cases during those 
eighteen months involved at least one erroneous claim term (N = 137), and over 40% of terms reviewed 
were reversed (N = 259). Furthermore, Moore and Schwartz have over three years of cases prior to 2000 
that were not included in our database. 
244 Three primary methods exist for calculating claim construction reversal rates: by individual 
claim term (term-by-term); by cases with at least one reversed term (case-by-case); and by cases 
reversed, vacated, and/or remanded due to erroneous constructions (by case impact). See Moore, supra 
note 7, at 238. We report all three herein, but generally refer to term-by-term rates unless otherwise 
indicated. 
245 The relationship between pre- and post-Phillips cases and reversal rates was tested for an 
association using logistic regression. The model included other explanatory variables, including field of 
technology, district court, and Federal Circuit judges on the panel. From our logistic regression 
analysis, we estimate the odds of affirmance are 75% higher (95% confidence interval: 38% to 122% 
higher) in post-Phillips cases than in pre-Phillips cases. This estimate is statistically significant 
(p < 0.001). 
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2006 21.6% 
2007 24.8% 
2008 31.1% 
2009 16.5% 
2010 21.7% 
2011 20.4% 
 
Figure 2 shows the term-by-term reversal rate as a rolling average over 
100 terms.246 
FIGURE 2: REVERSAL RATE—PER-CLAIM-TERM BASIS 
(100 TERM ROLLING AVERAGE) 
 
 
 
246 The vertical reference line indicates the date of the Phillips decision. A similar demarcation line 
appears throughout this Article. 
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A similar pattern emerges for case-by-case reversals. Figure 3 
illustrates the case-by-case reversal rate, which measures the rate at which 
the Federal Circuit reversed at least one term in claim construction cases. 
FIGURE 3: REVERSAL RATE—PER-CASE BASIS (AT LEAST ONE TERM) 
(100 CASE ROLLING AVERAGE) 
 
Prior to Phillips, reversal rates on claim construction were much higher 
than reversal rates on other patent issues.247 Historically, the Federal Circuit 
has reversed around 20% of appealed issues;248 however, the court was 
reversing 37.2% of claim terms prior to Phillips. Now, the reversal rate for 
claim construction appeals is much closer to that of other patent-related 
 
247 See Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)Certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 
1175 (2010) (footnote omitted) (finding that from 2000 to 2007, “the average reversal rate across all 
issues other than claim construction [was] 18 percent, and 21 percent for all issues including claim 
construction”); Paul M. Schoenhard, Reversing the Reversal Rate: Using Real Property Principles to 
Guide Federal Circuit Patent Jurisprudence, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 299, 300 
(2007) (“There is a pervasive perception that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reverses 
district court rulings in patent cases at an inordinately high rate. . . . If one focuses, however, only on 
the rate at which district court decisions involving claim construction are reversed on appeal, the figure 
is higher than for patent cases generally.”). 
248 See Moore, supra note 1, at 17 tbl.2 (examining every patent appeal from 1983 to 1999 and 
finding a 22% reversal rate across all appealed issues). 
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issues.249 Our data—showing a reversal rate of 24.0% since Phillips—
demonstrate that claim construction is no longer an extreme outlier at the 
Federal Circuit. 
2. Evidentiary Sources.250—There are two main types of evidence 
courts can use when construing claims: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic 
evidence consists of evidence from the patent document and file wrapper. 
Within the patent document itself, courts can look to the claims and the 
specification. Additionally, courts can examine the prosecution history of 
the patent, the written record of the patent application, and correspondence 
between the applicant and the Patent Office.251 District courts may also 
consult a variety of extrinsic sources in construing claim terms, including 
dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises; expert testimony; inventor 
testimony; and evidence of industry practice and norms. 
Overall, the Federal Circuit’s use of evidentiary sources remains 
largely unchanged since Phillips, with one significant but unsurprising 
exception: the court has substantially decreased its reliance on dictionaries. 
a. Intrinsic evidence.—Drawing on prior claim construction 
jurisprudence, the Phillips opinion encouraged district courts to rely upon 
intrinsic sources when performing claim construction.252 District judges 
have largely followed Phillips’s encouragement. As reflected in Figure 4, 
92.5% of terms in our database were construed using at least one form of 
intrinsic evidence.253 Most cases relied on several. That rate has not 
changed significantly since Phillips was decided. 
 
249 Indeed, given the fact that claim construction decisions are afforded no deference, it is perhaps 
surprising that reversal rates are now so low. Cf. Lefstin, supra note 7 (arguing that a reversal rate of 
over 30% is consistent with reversal rates in other forms of complex litigation). Whereas many 
appealed issues involve formal deference to the decision of the judge or jury below, only legal questions 
are reviewed de novo. Questions of fact are reviewed under a “clearly erroneous” standard. Even 
questions of law, such as obviousness, that are decided by a jury are reviewed with a presumption 
favoring the jury’s decision. Thus, only those issues of law that are decided by a judge (such as claim 
construction) are truly considered anew at the Federal Circuit. We consider this issue more fully in 
Part III infra. 
250 Evidentiary statistics reported in this Article include only those cases that are precedential or 
nonprecedential. Rule 36 summary affirmances are not included because no written opinion is issued in 
those cases and therefore no analysis of evidentiary sources used by the Federal Circuit could be 
performed. 
251 One can analogize these three types to sources used in statutory construction, with the claims 
representing the statutory language, the specification representing the explanatory notes and primary 
legislative reports, and the prosecution history representing the legislative history. 
252 See supra notes 184–91 and accompanying text. 
253 That number has not changed much since Phillips: 93% before and 91.3% after. 
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FIGURE 4: USAGE OF INTRINSIC EVIDENCE 
(100 TERM ROLLING AVERAGE) 
 
Not surprisingly, the most common source that the Federal Circuit 
consults in determining claim meaning is the patent specification. The 
specification describes the invention and teaches others how to practice the 
invention.254 Because the specification is statutorily required to contain a 
written description and an enabling disclosure of the invention,255 it has 
long been a rich source of meaning for courts. From 2000 through 2011, 
over 80% of appealed claim terms were analyzed in light of the 
specification’s teaching. The court relied heavily on the specification to 
determine claim meaning before (81.5% of terms) and after (80.2% of 
terms) Phillips. The use of the specification to interpret claims at the 
Federal Circuit has remained relatively consistent throughout the past 
decade. 
There has been a decrease in the use of prosecution history since 
Phillips. Before Phillips, 46.9% of terms construed involved examination 
of the prosecution history, while the Federal Circuit has examined the 
prosecution history for only 37.1% of terms construed since that time.256 
 
254 Technically, the claims form part of the specification. However, claims have become much 
more important than the rest of the specification over the past century. Also, Phillips treats the claims as 
separate from the specification for purposes of claim construction. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 
1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We follow that practice. 
255 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
256 The drop in usage is statistically significant (p < 0.001). 
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This drop in usage is likely tied to the differing views on claim construction 
methodology that existed immediately prior to Phillips. The period 
preceding Phillips exhibited a peak in the use of prosecution history as 
construction evidence. Although Phillips confirmed that prosecution 
history was part of the intrinsic record, the opinion emphasized the relative 
importance of the specification and the claims as the most pertinent and 
useful guides in ascertaining claim meaning.257 The use of prosecution 
history to construe claims post-Phillips appears to have returned to the rate 
observed in the early part of our study. 
b. Extrinsic evidence.—The Federal Circuit has decreased its 
reliance on extrinsic evidence since Phillips. Figure 5 illustrates that 
leading up to the Phillips decision, the Federal Circuit was increasingly 
reliant on some form of extrinsic evidence in claim construction 
determinations.258 A decline in the use of extrinsic evidence followed the 
decision. On average, before Phillips the Federal Circuit looked to extrinsic 
evidence with 33.2% of terms. Since then, the court has examined extrinsic 
evidence with only 26.3% of terms it has construed.259 
 
257 See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (“Yet because the prosecution history represents an ongoing 
negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it often 
lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.”). 
258 Extrinsic Evidence codes: (1) Dictionary/Treatise, (2) Expert, (3) Other. 
259 The drop in usage is statistically significant (p < 0.005). 
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FIGURE 5: USE OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE 
(100 TERM ROLLING AVERAGE) 
 
One type of extrinsic evidence—dictionaries—has become much less 
common post-Phillips. As one would expect, the Federal Circuit’s use of 
dictionaries in claim construction rose significantly after the Texas Digital 
decision in 2002.260 After Phillips reversed that line of cases, the use of 
dictionaries in construing claims declined precipitously, as reflected in 
Figure 6. Since Phillips, the Federal Circuit is much less likely to refer to a 
dictionary in construing a claim. Indeed in the last year of cases observed 
in this study (2011), dictionaries were used to define only 9.7% of terms, 
down from a high of 32.2% in the year before Phillips (2004).261 
 
260 See Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002), overruled by 
Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303. 
261 The drop in usage is statistically significant (p < 0.001). 
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FIGURE 6: USE OF DICTIONARIES 
(100 TERM ROLLING AVERAGE) 
 
In contrast to dictionary usage, the Federal Circuit’s use of expert 
evidence has increased slightly since Phillips. Overall, the Federal Circuit 
makes limited use of expert evidence in construing claims.262 The 
consistently low use of expert evidence is unsurprising given the Federal 
Circuit’s statement in Vitronics that expert evidence would “rarely, if ever” 
be necessary to construe claims.263 Prior to Phillips, the court examined 
expert evidence in 8.8% of appealed claim terms. It has done so in 12.1% 
of terms since the decision.264 
 
262 In coding for the use of expert evidence, we did not differentiate between instances in which the 
Federal Circuit relied upon the evidence and when it rejected the use of such evidence. Thus, the 
statistics reported herein describe the instances in which the Federal Circuit referenced such evidentiary 
sources in its opinion. 
263 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
264 The drop in usage is statistically significant (p < 0.05). 
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FIGURE 7: USE OF EXPERT EVIDENCE 
(100 TERM ROLLING AVERAGE) 
 
c. Summary of evidentiary sources.—The range of evidentiary 
sources utilized in claim construction decisions has changed slightly since 
Phillips: the court continues to rely heavily on the patent specification, is 
slightly less likely to consult the prosecution history after Phillips, is 
slightly more likely to consult expert opinion, and is much less likely to 
consult dictionary definitions. 
3. Judge-Specific Data.—Throughout the Federal Circuit’s history, 
there has been a common perception that case outcomes are significantly 
influenced by the outlook of the individual judges on one’s panel.265 We 
assess this question by examining voting patterns by judge. A total of 
sixteen judges adjudicated more than twenty-five appealed claim terms 
during our study period. Several other judges heard a smaller number of 
terms and are not included in the table below. Most of the judges who 
heard fewer than ten terms were part of the Federal Circuit’s initiative to 
invite federal judges from other courts (usually, but not always, district 
 
265 See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent 
Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 745 (2000) (discussing patent attorneys’ belief “that the 
outcome of their case depends on the panel they draw”); see also Mary L. Jennings, Should Advocates 
Be Informed of the Identities of Members of Judicial Panels Prior to Hearings?, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 41, 
41–42 (1996) (noting Federal Circuit practice to inform parties of their panel composition on the day of 
argument). 
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court judges) to sit by designation. A smaller number of judges not 
included in the table below were Federal Circuit judges who died shortly 
after the initial period of our study or who joined the court near the end of 
our study.266 
Table 4 presents the voting behavior of judges both before and 
after Phillips. The first and third columns indicate the percentage of terms 
for which each judge voted to reverse before and after Phillips, 
respectively. The second and fourth columns indicate the total claim terms 
adjudicated by each judge during the pre- and post-Phillips time periods. 
The final column indicates the change in rate of reversal votes since 
Phillips. 
TABLE 4: INDIVIDUAL VOTING BEHAVIOR 
Judge 
% Reverse 
Votes: 
Pre-Phillips 
# of Terms: 
Pre-
Phillips 
% Reverse 
Votes: 
Post-
Phillips 
# of Terms: 
Post-
Phillips 
Change, 
Reverse 
Vote Rate 
Archer 35.2% 54 20.0% 35 -15.2% 
Bryson 41.5% 236 20.0% 235 -21.5% 
Clevenger 31.5% 235 26.9% 93 -4.6% 
Dyk 49.1% 171 28.0% 214 -21.1% 
Friedman 33.3% 63 27.1% 48 -6.2% 
Gajarsa 30.2% 235 23.6% 237 -6.6% 
Linn 49.8% 227 28.7% 261 -21.1% 
Lourie 34.8% 233 21.1% 232 -13.7% 
Mayer 35.6% 188 19.0% 195 -16.6% 
Michel 34.9% 261 25.6% 142 -9.3 % 
Moore - - 24.6% 171 - 
Newman 30.0% 237 20.0% 225 -10.0% 
Plager 30.8% 91 29.2% 48 -1.6% 
Prost 32.2% 143 20.9% 234 -11.3% 
Rader 38.5% 257 28.4% 261 -10.1% 
Schall 42.0% 205 23.8% 185 -18.2% 
 
There is some variation among the frequency of individual reversal 
votes.267 Prior to Phillips, the individual reversal-vote rate varied from 
30.0% to 49.8%. This wide spread indicates that in the years prior to 
 
266 Senior Judges Skelton and Smith died in 2004 and 2001, respectively. See Biographical 
Directory of Federal Judges, 1789–Present, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/
page/judges.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2014). Judge O’Malley was appointed in 2010; Judges Reyna and 
Wallach were appointed in 2011. See Judges, supra note 224. 
267 Judge Moore’s study also found some variation. See Moore, supra note 1, at 25–26 (finding, 
pre-Phillips, that the affirmance-vote rate among judges with at least 100 terms construed to vary from 
60% to 73%). 
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Phillips, panel composition may have had a large impact on outcome. 
Indeed, the spread is 1.5 times as large as the spread reported by Moore in 
the years prior to our study (1996–2000).268 The large spread in our study 
may indicate that the period 2000–2005 was particularly polarized. 
Since Phillips, the divergence among judge reversal rates has 
decreased. The range of individual reversal-vote rates since Phillips is 
19.0%–29.2%. This narrower spread (around a mean of 24.0%) suggests 
that while claim construction decisions may still be influenced by panel 
composition,269 there is less variance than in the pre-Phillips era. Also 
noteworthy is the way in which the voting patterns of certain judges have 
changed dramatically since Phillips. Many judges on the court have 
reduced their propensity to vote to reverse on claim construction by over 
15%. 
Chart 1 illustrates the change in reversal votes by judge. While judge-
specific voting patterns are apparent (and likely inevitable for any difficult 
legal issue), there is a surprising dearth of dissents in claim construction 
cases. Over the twelve years we studied, there were 115 total dissents from 
the majority’s claim construction—6.0% of all appealed terms.270 For a 
legal issue that is commonly perceived to be fraught with ambiguity, the 
relative unanimity of claim construction decisions at the Federal Circuit is 
surprising. Interestingly, although claim construction dissents are relatively 
rare, they are more frequent during the period immediately preceding 
Phillips: eighteen of the dissents came in 2004, the year before Phillips, 
with another fifteen occurring in 2005. If dissents are a bellwether of 
change in claim construction jurisprudence, the nineteen dissents in 2010 
suggest that the Federal Circuit is once again divided over claim 
construction review. 
 
268 Id. 
269 Shawn P. Miller, Do “Fuzzy” Software Patent Boundaries Explain High Claim Construction 
Reversal Rates? 22 (Aug. 30, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (finding Judges Dyk, Linn, and Rader 
“significantly more likely to find claim construction error”), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2139146. 
270 Judge Moore’s pre-Phillips study found dissents from 3% of appealed terms. See Moore, supra 
note 1, at 23. 
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CHART 1: PERCENTAGE OF REVERSAL VOTES BY JUDGE  
 
4. Technology Areas.—Previous commentators have suggested that 
reversal rates may be tied to the increasing technological complexity of 
patents.271 Our study revealed that high-tech fields do not dominate the 
Federal Circuit’s claim construction docket: as Chart 2 demonstrates, 
mechanical inventions constitute the largest portion of the court’s cases, 
albeit a shrinking portion.272 Patents that are tied to the field of physics 
(acoustics, optics, energy-related, and semiconductors) make up a relatively 
small portion of the Federal Circuit’s claim construction docket.273 Patents 
associated with chemicals and pharmaceuticals make up a more sizable 
portion of the claim construction docket (12.5% and 6.2%, respectively), 
 
271 For an argument that this might be the case, see Chu, supra note 7, at 1106. See also Moore, 
supra note 1, at 3 (arguing that “the 33% error rate for claim construction creates doubt about the 
abilities of district court judges to adjudicate complex technical patent cases”). 
272 This observation corresponds with the percentage of all patents that are mechanical inventions. 
See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent 
Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2114 (2000) (finding that 32.9% of all issued patents were 
mechanical inventions). 
273 None of those categories take up more than 4.5% of the claim construction docket on appeal. 
Energy-related and acoustic technologies comprise 2.4% and 2.2% of all patents, respectively, see id. at 
2148 tbl.1, similar numbers to those patents’ appearance in claim construction appeals (1.7% and 0.5%, 
respectively). Optics and semiconductor patents, on the other hand, do seem to be less frequently 
involved in claim construction appeals than would be predicted in a random distribution. Those 
technologies make up 12.8% and 9.3%, respectively, of all patents, see id., yet only appear in 2.3% and 
4.4% of claim construction appeals, respectively. 
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yet still a relatively small number of the overall terms in our database 
(15.2% of unique terms construed).274 The ever-controversial category of 
business method patents appear in less than 3.9% of cases, yet nearly half 
of the appealed terms in that field are reversed. 
One potential criticism of any time-sequence study of claim 
construction is that patented technologies are constantly changing and one 
era’s valuable technologies may be easier to construe than another era’s. 
And it is certainly the case that the most valuable technologies during the 
pre-Phillips period (2000–2005) differ from the valuable technologies of 
the post-Phillips period (2005–2011). During the period from 2005 to 
2011, high-tech electronic devices experienced tremendous growth. 
Significant advances in communication technology—particularly wireless 
communications—also occurred in this period. The changing technological 
landscape is reflected in the increase that the court has seen in computer- 
and communications-related patents post-Phillips as shown in Chart 2 
below. It should be noted throughout this section that due to technological 
overlap, we permitted multiple technological codings for the same patent. 
Thus, the technological composition of the cases we studied will add up to 
something more than 100%. 
CHART 2: FREQUENCY OF APPEAL BY TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
274 Chemistry and pharmaceutical innovations constitute 28.5% of all patents issued. Id. 
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Although mechanical patents are still the largest single category of 
claim construction appeals, their frequency in appellate claim construction 
decisions has diminished significantly in the years following Phillips. 
Similarly, chemical patents make up a smaller portion of the Federal 
Circuit’s claim construction cases in the six years following Phillips. 
Computer-related and communications technologies experienced the 
largest increase in frequency since Phillips. Claim construction appeals 
from pharmaceutical patent cases—one of the most frequently affirmed 
technology areas—are also more frequent since Phillips. 
We cannot empirically rule out the possibility that the drop in reversal 
rate since Phillips is tied to the change in technological makeup. It does 
seem unlikely, however, that an increase in computer-related and 
communications technologies would decrease the Federal Circuit’s 
likelihood of reversal. Many computer-related and communications patents 
are among the most complex and difficult-to-construe technologies. 
Furthermore, one might suspect that a drop in the percentage of mechanical 
inventions reviewed by the court would lead to an increase in the court’s 
reversal rate because those patents are usually thought to be among the 
simplest. As demonstrated above, however, the data indicate precisely the 
opposite: in an era of increasing complexity, the Federal Circuit has 
significantly reduced its propensity to reverse on claim construction. 
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Chart 3 below provides more granulated data on technology reversal 
rates. 
CHART 3: REVERSAL RATES BY TECHNOLOGY FIELD 
 
Intriguingly, the only technology category that exhibits an increased 
reversal rate after Phillips is business methods. It is unclear why business 
method patents alone would exhibit an increase in reversal rate post-
Phillips. The increase may be due to a growing suspicion of business 
method patents from either the Federal Circuit or the district courts. 
Alternatively, it may simply be the result of the relatively small number of 
business method patents in our database. All other fields experienced a 
reduction in reversal rates following Phillips. Appeals of pharmaceutical 
claim construction are less frequent275 and have one of the highest 
affirmance rates of all technologies (80%). This comports with what many 
have suspected regarding the relative ease of accurately describing 
inventive single-molecule drugs.276 
5. Procedural Aspects of Claim Construction Appeals.—The Federal 
Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence has begun to change 
procedurally as well as doctrinally. As reflected in Figure 8, the Federal 
 
275 Only 6.6% of claim construction appeals are pharmaceutical patents. 
276 See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 106–07 (2008) (observing that 
researchers have noted that chemical and pharmaceutical patents have more clearly defined boundaries 
than other types of patents). 
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Circuit has increasingly relied upon summary affirmances to dispose of 
claim construction appeals.277 Whereas the court issued 18.7% of claim 
construction cases before Phillips under Rule 36—the rule that permits 
affirmance without opinion—it has done so in 30.2% of cases since that 
time. 
FIGURE 8: SUMMARY AFFIRMANCES 
(50 CASE ROLLING AVERAGE) 
 
6. PHOSITA?—One of the most surprising results we found after 
examining over a decade of Federal Circuit claim construction decisions is 
the paucity of opinions that address the characteristics and views of the 
PHOSITA. Black-letter claim construction jurisprudence reaffirmed in the 
Phillips decision holds that courts must interpret claims from the standpoint 
of the person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA).278 One would 
expect, therefore, that many of the cases would identify the relevant 
PHOSITA for the particular technology at issue, either as to educational or 
technical background, experience, knowledge of the field, or other relevant 
determinants of “skill.” 
But the data, both pre- and post-Phillips, show very little 
discussion of the PHOSITA. In only 12 of the 787 (1.5%) written claim 
construction opinions issued from 2000 through 2011 does the Federal 
Circuit even identify the PHOSITA. This result is stunning when one 
 
277 FED. CIR. R. 36. 
278 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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considers the central role that the PHOSITA occupies in claim 
construction. In spite of the PHOSITA’s importance, the Federal Circuit 
rarely fleshes out what attributes the PHOSITA possesses. This may well 
be the result of the Federal Circuit’s view of the diminishing importance of 
factual aspects of claim construction. 
III. INTERPRETING THE RESULTS 
Our most salient finding is the significant drop in claim construction 
reversals since the Phillips decision. That alone will be welcome news for 
many observers of the patent system. Increased certainty is beneficial for 
any property rights system. Lower reversal rates foster efficient bargaining 
between patent holders and those interested in making, using, and selling 
inventions. District judges can celebrate the greater deference accorded 
their decisions. And litigants will perhaps be better able to settle cases after 
a claim construction ruling or before appeal, thereby reducing their 
litigation costs and the disruption of their business. 
Yet it is not clear why the reversal rate has fallen by approximately 
one-third following a decision that largely reaffirmed prior holdings and 
did not change the standard of review. As explained herein, we think the 
answer lies with the Federal Circuit itself. Although Phillips did not 
radically alter the law of claim construction, the data indicate that the case 
represented a triumph for legal realism at the court: faced with 
embarrassingly high reversal rates, the court entered an era of informal 
deference to district court decisions. Before setting forth our theory of 
informal deference, this Part will discuss other potential theories for the 
reduction in the reversal rate. 
A. External Impact of Phillips 
Perhaps the most obvious explanation for the reduction in claim 
construction reversals following the Phillips decision is that the decision 
reduced the frequency of legal errors by district courts. Because claim 
construction is an issue reserved for judges,279 one possible explanation for 
our findings is that Phillips provided judges with an evidentiary hierarchy 
for performing claim construction which, if followed correctly, would 
better withstand appellate scrutiny. Essentially, the argument goes, district 
court judges now have a roadmap for crafting claim construction decisions 
that are more likely to withstand appellate review. 
We think that there is some merit to this theory. Although the Phillips 
decision was a disappointment to many legal academics and practitioners—
many of whom had hoped for a more rigorous standard for interpreting 
 
279 While some district courts rely heavily on magistrates or special masters to assist in claim 
construction, the ultimate arbiter of claim language is the district court judge. See generally Ronald B. 
Coolley, Magistrates and Masters in Patent Cases, 66 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 374 (1984). 
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claim language—the decision undoubtedly altered the manner in which 
claim construction is handled at the district court level. Prior to Phillips, 
many district courts followed the Federal Circuit’s Texas Digital standard. 
Texas Digital emphasized the importance of dictionaries in interpreting 
claims and led to litigation battles over which dictionary definition was the 
most appropriate in a given case. Such “battles of the dictionaries” were 
costly and unpredictable.280 Indeed, our data indicate that the high-water 
mark for reversals occurred during the Texas Digital era. 
But while this theory of improved guidance has some common-sense 
appeal, our data suggest that something more is driving the decline in 
reversal rates. First, if Phillips had reduced reversal rates simply by 
teaching district court judges the proper method of claim construction, we 
would expect to see reversal rates gradually drop over time. It should have 
taken several years for claim construction decisions by district court judges 
applying the Phillips framework to reach the Federal Circuit because claim 
construction rulings are appealable only upon a final decision (after grant 
of summary judgment or trial) and approximately a year in the appellate 
process.281 Thus, if this first theory were operating, there should be a two-
to-three-year lag in changes in reversal rates. 
Instead of seeing a gradual reduction in claim construction reversals 
after a lag, we find a large and immediate decline in the reversal rate. 
Within one year of the Phillips decision, average reversal rates of the 
previous 100 terms had dropped from 45% to around 25%.282 This indicates 
that the change that has occurred since Phillips is, at least in part, due to a 
change in the Federal Circuit’s review. Indeed, it is difficult to see what 
change Phillips could have had on district court judges. The primary 
contribution of Phillips to claim construction jurisprudence was in firmly 
establishing the hierarchy between intrinsic and extrinsic construction 
evidence. However, the court has always relied heavily on intrinsic sources. 
As demonstrated in Part II.C.2, the use of intrinsic and extrinsic sources has 
not been radically altered since Phillips. Instead, we see a mild increase in 
the use of experts, a mild decrease in the use of prosecution history, and a 
dramatic decrease in the use of dictionaries. We doubt that the decreased 
reliance on dictionaries can, by itself, explain the dramatic reduction in 
reversal rates. 
One could also speculate that Phillips may have instructed litigants in 
the types of claims that would be more likely to be reversed on appeal, thus 
altering the types of claims that were selected for appeal. We believe, 
however, that selection effects cannot fully explain the reduced reversal 
 
280 During the Texas Digital era, some law firms invested in acquiring hundreds of scientific 
dictionaries from different time periods. 
281 Judge Alan D. Lourie, A View from the Court (Sept. 27, 2008), available at http://www.cafc.
uscourts.gov/images/stories/announcements/2008/AL_Williamsburg_Speech.pdf. 
282 See infra Figure 10. 
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rates at the Federal Circuit. Rational litigants reacting to a significant drop 
in reversal rates would appeal fewer overall terms, yet succeed more often 
in those appeals because they are only appealing the most meritorious 
claims. This reaction would lead to an increase in reversal rates as only the 
most egregious cases would be appealed. Instead, the reversal rate has 
decreased. As time has passed and litigants have had time to assess the 
impact of Phillips, the reversal rate has not returned to pre-Phillips 
levels.283 In fact, the rate of reversal has continued to drop. The continued 
drop of reversal rates suggests that Phillips’s impact extends beyond 
instructing litigants as to the merits of their cases. Ultimately, we believe 
that the reduced claim construction reversal rates following Phillips are the 
result of something beyond merely better instructions for district judges 
and litigants. 
B. Internal Impact of Phillips 
1. Methodology.—Academics (and some Federal Circuit judges) 
have long suggested that claim construction at the Federal Circuit is 
plagued by panel effects. For example, Professors Wagner and 
Petherbridge have argued that the methodology employed by individual 
Federal Circuit judges is outcome determinative. Specifically, they found 
that characterization of a judge’s methodology as either “proceduralist” or 
“holistic” had a statistically significant impact on claim construction 
outcomes.284 Thus, one might argue that Phillips’s impact can be traced to 
the resolution of this interpretive debate identified by Wagner and 
Petherbridge.285 According to that line of thinking, Phillips resolved an 
internal dispute among the judges with one camp’s methodology prevailing 
over the other camp’s. 
We did not code for Wagner and Petherbridge’s methodological 
distinctions, so we cannot comment on the continuing validity of their 
findings. However, looking at individual judges’ voting patterns following 
Phillips reveals that whatever changes occurred following Phillips occurred 
across the entire court and not to a specific group of judges. The impact of 
Phillips appears much deeper than the resolution of a methodological 
divide. 
Wagner and Petherbridge identify two types of decisionmakers: 
holistic and proceduralist. The “holistic” approach to claim construction is 
a “less structured analysis, utilizing the array of possible interpretive 
 
283 The most recent year studied, 2011, saw a reversal rate of barely over 20%, less than half the 
pre-Phillips level. 
284 Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 1133–34 (defining what is meant by “procedural” and 
“holistic” methodologies). 
285 Note that Wagner and Petherbridge do not make this argument. In fact, they argue that Phillips 
did not change the methodological split on claim construction. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 
11 (manuscript at 133–38). 
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information in a flexible, case-specific fashion.”286 Proceduralists prefer to 
focus on the claim language and to search for the generally understood 
meaning of that language.287 Phillips was largely a holistic victory: it 
emphasized a hierarchy of sources and encouraged judges to look to the 
patent document (particularly the claims and the specification) for 
meaning.288 Thus, after Phillips, proceduralist judges may have felt that 
their method had been rejected and altered their voting patterns 
accordingly, while holistic judges, feeling vindicated, could have continued 
to vote as they always had. 
Instead, we observe something different: both groups—holistics and 
proceduralists—changed their voting patterns in similar ways following 
Phillips. For example, as reflected in Figure 9, Judge Bryson (characterized 
as a holistic) dramatically reduces his rate of voting for reversals in claim 
construction cases following Phillips. Indeed, Judge Bryson appears to be 
the judge whose voting pattern is most affected by Phillips, as his tendency 
to vote to reverse drops by 21.5% following the decision. If the “Phillips 
effect” were solely the result of settling a methodological question amongst 
the judges, we would expect to see the “holistics”—those judges who were 
using Phillips’s methodology before the decision—to have relatively stable 
reversal votes before and after the decision. However, this is not the case. 
The judges identified as holistics significantly altered their voting 
behavior.289 
 
286 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 1111 n.19. 
287 Wagner and Petherbridge identify Judges Clevenger, Dyk, and Linn as “proceduralist” judges. 
Id. at 1153 n.161. 
288 Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 11 (manuscript at 129) (“[T]he en banc Phillips opinion 
clearly suggests that the holistic approach is likely to be the better one . . . .”). 
289 All of the holistic judges altered their reversal voting patterns significantly: Judge Bryson 
(-21.5%), Judge Lourie (-13.7%), and Judge Newman (-10.0%). See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra 
note 1, at 1153 n.161 (identifying Judges Bryson, Lourie, and Newman as “holistic” judges). Appendix 
B more fully depicts the changes in these judges’ voting after Phillips. 
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FIGURE 9: JUDGE BRYSON’S REVERSAL PATTERN 
(50 TERM ROLLING AVERAGE) 
 
The proceduralist judges—Judges Dyk, Clevenger, and Linn—also 
exhibit a change in voting patterns after Phillips: Judges Dyk and Linn are 
two of the judges whose reversal rates changed most dramatically 
following Phillips, both falling by 21.1%.290 Thus, Phillips affected both 
camps in a similar manner. Whatever doctrinal divides existed before 
Phillips likely continue to exist to this day. Phillips had a broad impact on 
the voting behavior of the court. We think that this impact is best explained 
through the emergence of a new, informal deference to district court 
decisions. 
2. Deference.—We think the most likely explanation for the reduced 
reversal rate can be traced not to the majority opinion in Phillips, but rather 
to the dissent. Judge Mayer (joined by Judge Newman) did not take issue 
with the majority’s decision in Phillips. Rather, he took issue with the 
court’s de novo standard of review of claim construction. Judge Mayer 
contended that claim construction’s status as an issue of law was to blame 
for the high reversal rate and that greater deference to district courts was 
appropriate. 
 
290 Judge Clevenger had a more modest reduction in his reversal rate (4.6%). It should be noted that 
Judge Clevenger took senior status shortly after Phillips and therefore ruled on significantly fewer 
terms in the post-Phillips period. See Appendix B. 
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Following Phillips, it appears that the judges on the Federal Circuit 
began to question the de novo standard. Indeed, we think that Phillips is 
best understood as the beginning of the era of “informal deference” for 
claim construction at the Federal Circuit. By informal deference, we mean 
some standard that is less rigorous than de novo review and which defers, 
on the margins, to district court determinations. By deferring to the 
decisions of district courts, the Federal Circuit has decreased its reversal 
rate of claim construction from a pre-Phillips high of 44% in 2004 to less 
than 20% in 2009. 
The immediate drop in reversal rates following Phillips demonstrates a 
court that recognized the necessity of increased deference. As reflected in 
Figure 10, the reversal rate ticked up following grant of en banc review 
(dotted line), dropped significantly immediately following the oral 
argument in Phillips (dashed line), and after an increase following the 
issued opinion (solid line), the rate continued to drop. The court seems to 
have collectively recognized that the decision to review every opinion de 
novo had led to confusion and discontent. 
FIGURE 10: REVERSAL RATE SHOWING CRITICAL DATES 
(100 TERM ROLLING AVERAGE) 
 
The increased use of the summary affirmance procedure also supports 
a shift toward informal deference. Employing Rule 36 allows the Federal 
Circuit to affirm the district court without having to provide its own 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
62 
reasoning for the construction.291 The rule may also provide cover for the 
appellate court to affirm close decisions, even if the court might have come 
out differently reviewing the law on its own. 
Observation of the court reinforces our theory. Cybor’s de novo 
standard of review has long been controversial, even among Federal Circuit 
judges. A little over a year after the Phillips decision, a majority of the 
court expressed a desire to revisit Cybor.292 Additionally, formal 
recognition of some sort of deferential review has begun to creep into the 
decisions of the court. Before retiring from the court, Chief Judge Michel’s 
opinions began to frame the claim construction review process as 
something less than true de novo review. For example, in Randall May 
International, Inc. v. DEG Music Products, Inc., after reciting the standard 
boilerplate language of standard of review,293 Chief Judge Michel explained 
that “in reviewing a district court’s claim construction, this court takes into 
account the views of the trial judge. Though we review those views and the 
record de novo, ‘common sense dictates that the trial judge’s view will 
carry weight.’”294 This standard for review is explicitly deferential and thus 
something less than de novo.295 Other judges have begun to frame the claim 
construction inquiry in this rather paradoxical fashion as well.296 Several 
members of the Federal Circuit believe that the time is ripe to recognize the 
factual, evidentiary nature of the claim construction process. On several 
occasions, multiple members of the Federal Circuit have indicated their 
willingness to overrule Cybor in view of the factual nature of claim 
construction.297 The grant of en banc review in Lighting Ballast Control 
 
291 See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
292 Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel, 
C.J., joined by Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1042 (Newman, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1044 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing 
en banc); id. at 1045 (Gajarsa, Linn & Dyk, JJ., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (concurring 
but stating willingness to consider the issue in a more appropriate case). 
293 378 F. App’x 989, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
294 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
295 Chief Judge Michel used nearly identical language in Dow Jones & Co. v. Ablaise Ltd., 606 
F.3d 1338, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
296 Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc., 502 F. App’x 945, 947 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J.) 
(“We address claim construction as a matter of law, which we review without formal deference on 
appeal, although we give respect to the conclusions and reasoning of the district court.”). 
297 See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370–73 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (Moore, J., joined by Rader, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that 
“[c]laim construction is the single most important event in the course of a patent litigation”; the concern 
expressed by commentators that claim construction appeals are “‘panel dependent’ which leads to 
frustrating and unpredictable results for both the litigants and the trial court”; and the Supreme Court’s 
observation in Markman that claim construction is a “mongrel practice” and hence “is clearly a mixed 
question of law and fact and deference should be given to the factual parts”); id. at 1373 (O’Malley, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (expressing a desire to overturn Cybor); Trading Techs. 
Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting with irony in view of the factual 
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LLC v. Philips Electronics North America Corp.298 indicates that the 
appellate standard pendulum is gaining momentum. 
IV. TOWARD A COHERENT STANDARD OF APPELLATE CLAIM 
CONSTRUCTION REVIEW 
By emphasizing the importance of claim construction and taking claim 
construction out of the jury’s hands, the Markman case commenced a new 
era in patent litigation. The Supreme Court sought to leverage trial judges’ 
comparative advantages in the “mongrel” practice of construing 
documentary evidence from the standpoint of skilled artisans. The Court 
also sought to illuminate the process of construing patent claims by taking 
this task out of the black box of jury deliberations. Unfortunately, the 
Federal Circuit’s adherence to the view that claim construction is a pure 
question of law to which district courts’ judgments are owed no deference 
has undercut trial judges’ fact-finding role and the transparency of the 
claim construction process. 
Our empirical analysis reveals that the Federal Circuit’s en banc 
review of claim construction standards and procedures in the Phillips case 
was a turning point in the evolution of judicial review of claim construction 
decisions. The reversal rate dropped significantly shortly after the oral 
argument and has consistently remained well below pre-Phillips levels. The 
claim construction reversal rate of every member of the Federal Circuit has 
fallen since that time. However, there remains substantial variation among 
Federal Circuit judges in the degree of “deference” accorded lower court 
claim constructions. More recent cases, as illustrated by the dissents from 
rehearing the Retractable Technologies case en banc, confirm that the 
Federal Circuit remains divided over the appellate review standard for 
claim construction. 
The drop in reversal rates since Phillips suggests that the Federal 
Circuit is currently more deferential to district court claim construction 
decisions than previously thought. The standards set forth in Phillips, 
however, do not provide a doctrinal basis for increased deference. 
 
nature of claim construction that “[t]his court’s prior en banc decision requires a review of the district 
court’s claim construction without the slightest iota of deference”); Amgen, 469 F.3d at 1041 (Michel, 
C.J., joined by Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 
1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Lourie, J., joined by Newman, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (proposing that the Federal Circuit “ought to lean toward affirmance of a claim 
construction in the absence of a strong conviction of error”); see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 
138 F.3d 1448, 1480–91 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Newman, J., joined by Mayer, C.J., additional 
views) (observing that “[t]he value of extrinsic evidence in claim interpretation is not surprising, 
because patent documents are written by and for persons in the field of the invention, not for judges”; 
although the patent and file history are the primary source of information concerning patent scope, 
“such documents are directed to persons knowledgeable in the field; additional evidence and expert 
testimony as to their meaning should be the rule, not the exception”). 
298 500 F. App’x 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 
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Although cutting back on the special role for dictionaries approved in the 
Federal Circuit’s Texas Digital decision and affording district courts 
somewhat greater leeway to consider extrinsic evidence, Phillips retained 
the Cybor de novo review standard. If anything, the Phillips decision 
enhanced the Federal Circuit’s scope of review by emphasizing the role of 
the specification in patent claim construction. Yet the claim construction 
reversal rate has unmistakably dropped. Thus, even though dozens of cases 
and academic articles have examined the proper deference standard, the 
proper standard remains elusive, even to members of the Federal Circuit. 
Drawing upon jurisprudential foundations and functional criteria, we 
offer a coherent resolution to this puzzle. The problem derives from the 
ambiguity of “deference” as applied to the “mongrel” nature of claim 
construction. The jurisprudential basis for “deferring” to lower court claim 
constructions is not trial judges’ policy expertise or experience vis-à-vis the 
Federal Circuit, but rather the inherently factual aspects of patent claim 
construction. The functional basis derives from adjudication-specific and 
systemic effects of different levels of deference to trial court claim 
construction determinations. 
This Part begins by clarifying the jurisprudential basis of claim 
construction. It then examines the functional underpinnings of the standard 
of review for patent claim construction determinations. These sections 
provide the foundation for explicating the proper appellate review standard. 
A. The Nature of Claim Construction 
The starting point for assessing the proper standard for appellate 
review of patent claim construction rulings is examination of the nature of 
the inquiry. As the Supreme Court recognized in Markman, claim 
construction has long been a “mongrel practice.”299 The trial court must 
interpret claim terms from the standpoint of the skilled artisan within the 
context of the intrinsic record. Trial judges gain this perspective through 
extrinsic evidence which, when contested, requires subsidiary factual 
assessments such as the credibility of expert witnesses. Even though 
intrinsic evidence trumps contrary expert testimony, the interpretation of 
the intrinsic evidence itself must be conducted from the standpoint of the 
skilled artisan. While the Supreme Court established that the ultimate 
interpretation of a patent claim term is for the trial judge to render, the 
nature of the inquiry inherently involves factual determinations—how else 
can lay judges300 stand in the shoes of skilled artisans? 
At least since Markman, there has been a clear divide between district 
judges and a majority of the Federal Circuit over whether claim 
 
299 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996). 
300 See Plager, supra note 5 (observing that “[m]ost district court judges do not have scientific 
training, and most have not chosen law clerks with technical or patent backgrounds”). 
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construction entails fact-finding. All district court judges who have spoken 
to the issue see a significant role for fact-finding in deciphering the 
meaning of disputed patent claim terms from the standpoint of skilled 
artisans.301 Federal Circuit Chief Judge Rader as well as Judges Newman, 
Moore, and O’Malley share the view that the Federal Circuit should apply a 
deferential standard of review, as did Chief Judges Mayer and Michel prior 
to their retirements from the court.302 Furthermore, Judges Dyk, Gajarsa, 
and Linn have acknowledged that the Federal Circuit should defer to the 
district court on claim construction in at least those “atypical case[s] in 
which the language of the claims, the written description, and the 
prosecution history on their face did not resolve the question of claim 
interpretation, and the district court found it necessary to resolve 
conflicting expert evidence to interpret particular claim terms in the field of 
the art.”303 
Our empirical analysis indicates that a statistically significant de facto 
shift in the appellate standard has already occurred. This suggests that the 
disagreement over the standard of appellate review of claim construction 
rulings has evolved from a difference in kind (whether claim construction 
is a question of law or a mixed question) to a difference in degree (the 
extent to which fact-finding enters into claim construction determinations). 
The Federal Circuit justifies de novo review, in part, on a passage 
taken out of context from the Supreme Court’s Markman ruling. In 
Markman, the Supreme Court noted that its own “experience with 
document construction” left it “doubtful” that there would be many cases 
“in which a simple credibility judgment would suffice to choose between 
experts whose testimony was equally consistent with a patent’s internal 
logic.”304 It then observed that “[i]n the main, we expect, any credibility 
determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated 
analysis of the whole document, required by the standard construction rule 
that a term can be defined only in a way that comports with the instrument 
as a whole.”305 From this inference, the Court reasoned that the trial 
judge—possessing the “trained ability to evaluate the testimony in relation 
 
301 See, e.g., Trading Techs. Int’l, 595 F.3d at 1363–64 (Clark, District Judge (E.D. Tex.), 
concurring); Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329, 333–34 n.7 (D. Del. 1995) 
(Schwartz, J.); Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 857 (D. Del. 
1995) (McKelvie, J.); In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 
1354, 1359 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (Easterbrook, Circuit Judge (7th Cir.), sitting by designation), aff’d, 71 F.3d 
1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Holderman, supra note 5, at 7, 14; O’Malley et al., supra note 8, at 680 (remarks 
of Judge O’Malley). 
302 See supra note 297. 
303 See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc, 469 F.3d 1039, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(Gajarsa, Linn & Dyk, JJ., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
304 Markman, 517 U.S. at 389. 
305 Id. 
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to the overall structure of the patent”306—“is in the better position to 
ascertain whether an expert’s proposed definition fully comports with the 
specification and claims and so will preserve the patent’s internal 
coherence. We accordingly think there is sufficient reason to treat 
construction of terms of art like many other responsibilities that we cede to 
a judge in the normal course of trial, notwithstanding its evidentiary 
underpinnings.”307 
In Cybor, the Federal Circuit read this passage to support its 
conclusion that claim construction is a question of law and hence subject to 
de novo review.308 That interpretive leap, however, misapprehends the 
Supreme Court’s evident intention when the full paragraph is considered. 
While the sentence noting that “any credibility determinations will be 
subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole 
document” might be read in isolation to downplay the factual 
underpinnings of claim construction, the final sentence in the paragraph 
makes clear that the Supreme Court intended the opposite in analogizing to 
rulings that a trial judge routinely resolves during the course of trial, which 
are not subject to de novo review.309 Thus, the more plausible interpretation 
of the full passage is that the Supreme Court is inclined toward a 
deferential standard of review of claim construction determinations 
reflecting the inherently “mongrel”—mixed fact and law—character of 
claim construction. 
That the Cybor majority missed this subtlety is apparent in its 
suggestion that “[n]othing in the Supreme Court’s opinion supports the 
view that the Court endorsed a silent, third option—that claim construction 
may involve subsidiary or underlying questions of fact.”310 In the 
accompanying footnote to this sentence, the Cybor majority reasons that 
“[i]f this were so, surely the Supreme Court would have discussed whether 
subsidiary or underlying fact questions should be decided by the judge or 
the jury.”311 Yet the Supreme Court’s passage answers this suggestion. It 
analogizes the trial judge’s “trained ability to evaluate the testimony in 
relation to the overall structure of the patent”312 to the “many other 
responsibilities that we cede to a judge in the normal course of trial.”313 In 
so stating, the Supreme Court justifies leaving the entire claim construction 
 
306 Id. at 390. 
307 Id. 
308 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
309 See Steven Alan Childress, Standards of Review Primer: Federal Civil Appeals, 229 F.R.D. 
267, 289–91 (2005) (observing that “[c]ourts commonly recite the deferential ‘abuse of discretion’ test 
as broadly and generally appropriate on review of evidence calls”). 
310 Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455. 
311 Id. at 1455 n.4. 
312 Markman, 517 U.S. at 390. 
313 Id. 
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exercise in the trial judge’s hands “notwithstanding its evidentiary 
underpinnings,”314 i.e., its factual character. Following this logic, subsidiary 
factual issues in claim construction rulings, “like [the] many other 
responsibilities that we cede to a judge in the normal course of a trial,”315 
would be subject to a more deferential standard of review. In this way, the 
Cybor majority overlooked the potential for subsidiary factual questions—
such as whether a patent claim term has special meaning to a skilled 
artisan. 
The next section evaluates the standard of appellate review based on 
functional considerations—the type of inquiry that the Supreme Court 
applied in determining that claim construction is a matter for the court and 
not for the jury. 
B. Functional Analysis of Appellate Review of Claim Construction 
The standard of appellate review for claim construction determinations 
potentially affects several key aspects of the patent system. It is useful to 
distinguish between two levels of effects: (1) adjudication-specific 
effects—the quality, timing, and costs of patent litigation; and (2) larger 
systemic effects—predictability and consistency of patent boundaries. 
1. Adjudication-Specific Effects.—At the adjudication-specific level, 
the standard of appellate review influences the incentives and choices of 
jurists and parties in patent litigation. The Federal Circuit’s de novo review 
standard has had several deleterious effects on the quality, timing, and costs 
of patent litigation. By downplaying the factual nature of claim 
construction, the Vitronics and Cybor decisions discouraged district judges 
from considering expert witnesses in the manner that would be most 
productive.316 Even though technical experts may lack the training and 
experience in interpreting documents, their perceptions about how to read a 
claim term in the context of the intrinsic evidence could shed valuable light 
on the ultimate interpretive question.317 A court might also benefit from 
asking experienced patent drafters whether particular terms have accepted 
meaning within the claim drafting art or how the prosecution history 
 
314 Id. 
315 Id. 
316 See supra notes 150–52, 160–65 and accompanying text. 
317 Cf. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Rader, 
C.J.) (noting that the Supreme Court observed in Markman that the “trial court occupies the best 
vantage point and possesses the best tools to resolve those evidentiary questions”); Amgen Inc. v. 
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040–41 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel, C.J., joined by Rader, 
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[C]laim construction question[s] often cannot be 
answered without assessing, at least implicitly, what the average artisan knew and how she thought 
about the particular technology when the patent claims were written. To make such determinations, the 
trial judge necessarily relies upon prior art documents and other evidence concerning the skill of the 
ordinary artisan at the relevant time. Indeed, trial judges are arguably better equipped than appellate 
judges to make these factual determinations, especially in close cases.”). 
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illuminates claim meaning.318 As Professor Golden has argued, there is 
good reason to view at least some claim terms from the patent attorney-
plus-artisan standpoint.319 Our claim construction database reveals that 
many, if not most, of the disputed appealed terms are not purely technical 
terms but rather terms that are better understood from the standpoint of the 
skilled claim drafter. It is rare for courts to admit into evidence claim 
drafting custom and practice, yet that may well be the best source for 
construing some and possibly many patent claim terms. 
Thus, the Vitronics–Cybor framework for claim construction has 
deprived the district court of critical evidence bearing on claim meaning. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on intrinsic evidence and the erroneous view 
that claim construction is a pure question of law has forced judges to spend 
countless hours reading and rereading the patent specification without the 
opportunity to fully and directly engage with those most familiar and 
conversant with the patent claim language in its technological, industrial, 
and claim drafting context. The de novo standard discourages trial judges 
from hearing experts debate a claim term’s meaning and then using their 
experience to make credibility determinations to resolve the dispute. 
The limited record from Markman proceedings in conjunction with the 
concern that touting extrinsic evidence is more likely to lead to reversible 
error distorts the trial courts’ analysis and explication of their reasoning in 
reaching a particular claim construction. Some district judges have decided 
that it is better to provide little or no reasoning for their claim 
constructions320—possibly on the grounds that the Federal Circuit will be 
conducting their own analysis or possibly because anything that they 
 
318 Cf. Edward D. Manzo, How to Improve Patent Claim Interpretations, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 203, 
207–09 (2012) (noting that patent law experts have traditionally been limited to describing Patent 
Office procedures, but suggesting a broader role in addressing claim drafting and prosecution practices). 
319 See Golden, supra note 91, at 383–85. 
320 See, e.g., Hollingsworth & Vose Filtration Ltd. v. Delstar Techs., Inc., No. 10-788 GMS (D. 
Del. Jul. 10, 2012), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/100456939/Hollingsworth-Vose-Filtration-
Ltd-v-Delstar-Techs-Inc-C-A-No-10-788-GMS-D-Del-Jul-10-2012 (Order Construing the Terms of 
U.S. Pat. No. 6,623,548) (cursory opinion with no discussion of factual predicates, evidentiary sources, 
or explication of the claim construction process; footnotes limited to discussion of intrinsic sources and 
Federal Circuit jurisprudence); Shelbyzyme LLC v. Genzyme Corp., No. 09-768 GMS (D. Del. Jul. 8, 
2011), available at http://www.delawareiplaw.com/2011/07/chief_judge_sleet_claim_constr.html 
(Order Construing the Terms of U.S. Pat. No. 7,011,831) (cursory opinion with a footnote summarizing 
Federal Circuit precedent emphasizing the primacy of intrinsic evidence and noting that “the parties 
presented conflicting extrinsic evidence . . . which the court will not consider”); In re Alfuzosin 
Hydrochloride Patent Litig., No. 08-md-1941 GMS (D. Del. May 20, 2009), available at http://
www.delawareiplaw.com/2009/06/chief_judge_gregory_m_sleet_claim_construction_order.html 
(Order Construing the Terms of U.S. Patent No. 4,661,491) (cursory claim construction ruling with 
minimal explanation); In re Rembrandt Techs., LP Patent Litig., No. 07-md-1848 GMS, 2008 WL 
5773604 (D. Del. 2008) (construing over 100 claim terms without setting forth any analysis in the claim 
construction order). 
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explain can and will be used against them in the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit.321 
In addition to compromising the care and logic that comes from 
building a factual record and preparing a reasoned opinion, the de novo 
review regime undermines the appellate process. The parties, the public, 
and the appellate court lack the fully developed record and reasoned 
opinion that would enable them to get a transparent view of what occurred 
and to evaluate its correctness. Instead, de novo review substitutes an 
independent review of an anemic record—typically limited to the intrinsic 
evidence. 
On the other side of the balance, the argument can be made that de 
novo review improves the quality of patent adjudication by providing 
independent analysis of a patent’s metes and bounds by an experienced 
appellate tribunal. Yet that check is only as good as the record and the 
ability of the appellate jurists to evaluate the most pertinent evidence, both 
of which are contradicted by the foregoing analysis. Former Chief Judge 
Michel came to believe that de novo review “inundat[es]” the Federal 
Circuit “with the minutia of construing numerous disputed claim terms (in 
multiple claims and patents) in nearly every patent case” notwithstanding 
that trial judges often have a comparative advantage in mastering the full 
record and better understanding the skilled artisan’s perspective.322 
An argument can also be made that the Federal Circuit provides a 
potential check on inexperienced district court jurists or “renegade” 
districts.323 Yet de novo review of claim construction rulings does not 
appear to be an effective tool for addressing these concerns. Empirical 
 
321 Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966); see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 
138 F.3d 1448, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting in part, concurring in the 
judgment, and joining part IV of the en banc opinion) (suggesting that the de novo standard encourages 
trial judges to “disguise the real reasons for their interpretation”). 
322 Amgen, 469 F.3d at 1040 (Michel, C.J., joined by Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing 
en banc) (suggesting that de novo review “inundat[es]” the Federal Circuit “with the minutia of 
construing numerous disputed claim terms (in multiple claims and patents) in nearly every patent 
case”); see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) 
(Newman, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the need for the trier of fact to “make[] findings that depend on 
the weight, credibility, and probative value of conflicting evidence” to determine how a person skilled 
in the art understands “technologic terms and words of art” used in patent claims), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 
(1996). 
323 See Donald R. Dunner, A Retrospective of the Federal Circuit’s First 25 Years, 17 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 127, 130 (2008) (noting that the Eastern District of Texas is perceived as pro-patentee); Jeanne C. 
Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1462–65 (2010) (noting widespread forum shopping 
in district courts); Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the 
Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE 
J.L. & TECH. 193, 210–15 (2007) (arguing that juries in the Eastern District of Texas are plaintiff 
friendly); Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect 
Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 903–07 (2001). But cf. Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia’s 
“Renegade Jurisdiction”: Lessons for Patent Law Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 111, 136–43 (2008) 
(suggesting alternative explanations for the Eastern District of Texas’s popularity as a patent venue). 
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research indicates that experienced jurists have fared no better than novices 
on claim construction appeals324 and that the Eastern District of Texas—
which has been a magnet for nonpracticing entity patent cases—has not 
fared worse than average on claim construction reversals.325 Furthermore, 
other doctrines—such as venue326—are available to address concerns about 
districts seeking to attract patent cases. Shifting to a more deferential 
standard on claim construction would not eliminate judicial review 
altogether. 
The private and social costs of the de novo standard of review at the 
adjudication-specific level manifest in various ways: lower quality 
decisionmaking at both the trial and appellate levels, higher costs of 
litigation as a result of more appeals and retrials following reversals, 
greater uncertainty regarding the litigation,327 longer case pendency and 
litigation costs as a result of fewer and delayed settlements,328 the 
distraction and disruption of litigation on the technology marketplace, and 
the added burdens on the judiciary and the judicial system.329 Much of the 
 
324 See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 279. 
325 As reflected in Appendix C, the Eastern District of Texas has experienced the lowest reversal 
rate among the most active patent districts over the 2000–2010 period. 
326 See, e.g., In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361, 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam) 
(ordering venue transfer where U.K. plaintiff incorporated affiliate and established office without 
employees in Tyler, Texas, sixteen days before filing suit there); In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 
1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (ordering transfer out of the Eastern District of Texas where “the plaintiff 
is attempting to game the system by artificially seeking to establish venue by sharing office space with 
another of the trial counsel’s clients”); In re Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 587 F.3d 1333, 1337–38 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (ordering transfer from Eastern District of Texas where plaintiff’s only connection to 
transferring district was storing electronic documents locally); In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 
1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (ordering venue transfer where “there [wa]s no relevant connection 
between the actions giving rise to this case and the Eastern District of Texas except that certain vehicles 
containing TS Tech’s headrest assembly have been sold in the venue”). See generally MENELL, supra 
note 17, § 2.3.3.1 (discussing venue transfer motions). 
327 See Holderman, supra note 5, at 11 (listing the de novo standard of review in claim construction 
as among the factors contributing to the uncertainty of patent litigation). 
328 See Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Clark, 
District Judge (E.D. Tex.), concurring) (suggesting that “the current de novo standard of review for 
claim construction may result in the unintended consequences of discouraging settlement, encouraging 
appeals, and, in some cases, multiplying the proceedings”); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, 
Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel, C.J., joined by Rader, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (suggesting that de novo review “discourage[s] settlements”); Cybor Corp. v. FAS 
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1475–76 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting in part, 
concurring in the judgment, and joining part IV of the en banc opinion) (suggesting that the de novo 
review standard would discourage and delay settlement). 
329 See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc. 320 F.3d 1317, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing FED. R. CIV. 
P. 50) (“[A] change in the claim construction at the appellate level generally necessitates a remand to 
the district court to consider new factual issues unless the record on appeal supplies substantial evidence 
to support the jury verdict under the new claim construction.”); Moore, supra note 1, at 2–3 (footnotes 
omitted) (“In the absence of a route for expedited appeal of claim construction, district courts are forced 
to proceed with lengthy and expensive patent litigation based on their frequently erroneous claim 
construction.”). 
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cost—both private and social—derives from the discouraging effect of de 
novo review on early settlement of patent cases. As noted earlier, the costs 
of appellate review are relatively low in comparison to the costs of 
litigating a patent case through trial. Therefore, parties who lose at trial are 
far more likely to pursue an appeal under the de novo standard than they 
would be under a more deferential regime. This not only delays resolution, 
but also results in a substantial number of retrials. Overall, the de novo 
standard has raised the cost of patent litigation without any discernible 
benefits in terms of improved decisionmaking at the adjudication-specific 
level. 
2. Systemic Effects.—The Federal Circuit based its de novo standard 
on promoting better notice, certainty, and national uniformity of patent 
boundaries.330 The Federal Circuit’s logic appears to be that as the national 
appellate patent court, the Federal Circuit is uniquely positioned to provide 
nationally uniform interpretations of patent boundaries. It is doubtful, 
however, that de novo review of claim construction rulings serves these 
goals due to structural and practical problems. 
At the structural level, the Federal Circuit has limited authority to 
declare the boundaries of a patent beyond the parties in the suit.331 The 
Federal Circuit’s interpretation of a patent in one case cannot be asserted 
offensively by the patentee in a later infringement action against other 
defendants, although it can bar the patentee from seeking an alternative 
interpretation.332 Because the patent system has no mechanism for 
conclusively establishing patent scope with regard to all potential 
infringers, the certainty that flows from appellate interpretations is not 
ironclad as subsequent defendants can potentially bring new evidence or 
more effective advocacy to bear on claim meaning. Thus, while de novo 
review increases the likelihood that the Federal Circuit will construe a 
patent in the same manner across cases, the limited benefits of that 
uniformity are outweighed by the drawbacks of refusing deference.333 What 
 
330 See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1455 (noting that “treating interpretive issues as purely legal will 
promote (though not guarantee) intrajurisdictional certainty through the application of stare decisis on 
those questions not yet subject to interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority of the single appeals 
court” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 
(1996))); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) 
(grounding its view that claim construction is a matter of law on the principle that “it is only fair (and 
statutorily required) that competitors be able to ascertain to a reasonable degree the scope of the 
patentee’s right to exclude”), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370. 
331 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 317, 350 (1971). 
332 See MENELL, supra note 17, §§ 5.3.2.5, 5.3.3, 5.3.4 (discussing reasoned deference, judicial 
estoppel, and stare decisis as applied to claim construction rulings). 
333 See Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)Certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 1109, 1149–50 (2010) (noting that de novo review “increases certainty by ensuring that each 
patent will be subject to a uniform claim construction” while decreasing certainty by making district 
court claim constructions more vulnerable to reversal). 
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our analysis shows is that achieving that goal through de novo review of 
patent claim construction misapprehends comparative institutional analysis 
at a heavy cost. Claim clarity can and should be handled through the claim 
indefiniteness doctrine334 and through greater efforts by the Patent Office to 
ensure that patent claims are clear at the front end of patent protection.335 
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit has overemphasized the role of 
intrinsic evidence in claim construction in its idealized, but flawed, view 
that patent claims should have a singular meaning to the public. Yet by 
failing to fully recognize that the “public” in the patent context means 
skilled artisans to whom trial judges have greater access, the Federal 
Circuit has substituted its own views of intrinsic evidence for the more 
subtle and multifaceted view that is possible at the trial court level. In so 
doing, it has distorted and supplanted the appropriate role for skilled 
artisans in the delineation of patent claim boundaries. As our empirical 
analysis indicates, the Federal Circuit’s review of claim construction rarely 
addresses the skilled artisan perspective.336 Thus, de novo review focused 
on often ambiguous intrinsic evidence produces an artificial sense of clarity 
and uniformity. 
At a more practical level, the sheer number of patents (and patent 
claims) issued annually by the Patent Office337 severely limits the Federal 
Circuit’s ability to provide more than a thimble-sized solution to an ocean-
sized challenge. The Federal Circuit is able to review a very small subset of 
the millions of patent claims granted each year, and this occurs only after 
years of litigation and typically hundreds of thousands or millions of 
dollars spent on litigation. There is little reason to believe that the Federal 
Circuit’s arrogation of primacy over claim construction has done much if 
anything to promote greater certainty over patent claim boundaries.338 
The Federal Circuit’s desire to promote universal meaning and 
certainty is laudable, but misdirected. The nature of the patent system and 
due process considerations point toward a multi-institutional solution to 
achieving optimal notice. Relying on the Federal Circuit to operate as an 
effective “quiet title” institution misapprehends its fundamental 
characteristics and the challenge of promoting clear boundaries within a 
system that produces millions of intangible property “parcels” per year. 
 
334 “When a claim cannot be construed, it is indefinite, and therefore invalid.” MENELL, supra note 
17, § 5.2.4.2. 
335 See Peter Menell, It’s Time to Make Vague Software Patents More Clear, WIRED (Feb. 7, 2013, 
4:10 PM), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/02/its-time-to-make-vague-software-patents-more-
clear/. 
336 See supra Part II.C.6. 
337 See PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENTS 
STATISTICS CHART, CALENDAR YEARS 1963–2012 (noting 276,788 patent grants in 2012), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm. 
338 See Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in the Age of Markman and Mantras, 2001 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 355, 382 (observing that “de novo review delays certainty”). 
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The Patent Office can and should play a more central role in achieving 
clear patent boundaries at the front end and developing taxonomies, search 
tools, and other mechanisms for reinvigorating the patent system’s role in 
resource planning.339 By contrast, the Federal Circuit should focus upon 
quality control of patent trial tribunals, bearing in mind their institutional 
limitations. Although this could occasionally produce incongruities in 
patent meaning across different lower courts, the costs of overlooking the 
inherently factual nature of patent claim construction—in terms of loss of 
transparency, litigation delays and costs, and discouragement of 
settlement—significantly outweigh the questionable uniformity benefits. 
C. A Hybrid Appellate Review Standard 
These jurisprudential and functional considerations support a standard 
of appellate review that depends primarily on the evidentiary basis of the 
claim construction determination and secondarily on a general balancing of 
accuracy and process costs in patent adjudication. The basis for “deferring” 
to lower court claim constructions is not trial judges’ policy expertise or 
experience vis-à-vis the Federal Circuit but rather the inherently factual 
aspects of patent claim construction: tracing the origins of disputed terms, 
characterizing their basis (whether a claim term has special meaning to 
skilled artisans, claim drafters generally, or the particular 
patentee/prosecuting attorney or agent—i.e., the patentee is a lexicographer 
with respect to the claim term in question), and deciphering the meaning of 
the contested claim term from the perspective of a skilled artisan. As the 
Supreme Court has explained: 
 The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not limited to the 
superiority of the trial judge’s position to make determinations of credibility. 
The trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with experience 
in fulfilling that role comes expertise. Duplication of the trial judge’s efforts in 
the court of appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to the 
accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources. 
In addition, the parties to a case on appeal have already been forced to 
concentrate their energies and resources on persuading the trial judge that their 
account of the facts is the correct one; requiring them to persuade three more 
judges at the appellate level is requiring too much. As the Court has stated in a 
different context, the trial on the merits should be “the ‘main event’ . . . rather 
than a ‘tryout on the road.’” For these reasons, review of factual findings 
 
339 See Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J. Legal 
Analysis 1, 33–34, 36 (2013); Peter S. Menell, Promoting Patent Claim Clarity (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley 
Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 2171287, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2171287. 
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under the clearly-erroneous standard—with its deference to the trier of fact—
is the rule, not the exception.340 
Yet the interpretation of intrinsic evidence—like the interpretation of 
other documents, such as contracts and statutes—inclines toward de novo 
or independent review. Even here, however, the “mongrel” character of 
patent claim construction suggests a reviewing court should be cautious in 
overturning the district court’s determination. Unlike a statute (which is 
viewed from a lay perspective),341 the intrinsic evidence in a patent case is 
viewed from the standpoint of a skilled artisan. Thus, the proper standard 
of review must integrate deferential review of factual predicates with 
something approaching de novo review of documentary sources to achieve 
the ultimate appellate determination. We say “something approaching de 
novo review” for intrinsic evidence because even those documents must be 
viewed from the perspective of the skilled artisan, which the trial court is 
better positioned to perceive. Thus, like the claim construction 
determination itself, the appellate standard is distinctively “mongrel” in 
character. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “[f]indings of fact, 
whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial 
court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”342 Thus, the Federal 
Circuit must defer to trial judges’ factual determinations in claim 
construction rulings. Since the patent document defines the invention, the 
Federal Circuit retains a substantial check on the overall claim construction 
determination through de novo authority over the intrinsic record and 
whether the trial court’s factual finding inappropriately overrides more 
specific intrinsic indications of the patent’s scope. 
In practice, this proposed standard of review, consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s Markman decision, will introduce a hybrid or sliding 
scale character to appellate review depending on the quality of the patent 
disclosure, nature of the disputed claim term (technical, common parlance, 
glossary), evidentiary record, and the rationale for the trial court’s 
construction. Where the patent clearly defines the disputed term, there will 
be little or no role for fact-finding. But where the patent instrument is 
opaque, the specification does not address the term (as can occur with 
amended claims), or the term arguably diverges from common parlance, 
then the judge’s resolution of conflicting testimony takes on much greater 
moment. 
 
340 Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574–75 (1985) (omission in original) 
(quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)). 
341 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 325–27 (1990) (discussing intentionalist interpretation). 
342 See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6); Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574–75. 
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Consequently, where the claim term is particularly susceptible to 
PHOSITA construction, the district court’s ruling would carry great weight. 
But where the term is set forth or substantially constrained by the 
specification or prosecution history, then the intrinsic record would control. 
Even in this latter circumstance, however, we believe that the Federal 
Circuit should apply a heightened standard for reversal, such as a showing 
by the challenger of unambiguous evidence in the intrinsic record 
supporting an alternative construction. In general, this approach would be 
more deferential than de novo review, but also reflect fidelity to the 
intrinsic record where it provides unambiguous claim restrictions. Thus, 
trial courts’ claim construction rulings should be upheld if not clearly 
erroneous or clearly contradicted by the specification or prosecution 
history. 
This process would begin, as current claim construction practice 
does,343 with the trial judge attempting to determine the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the patent claim terms within the context of the claim. The trial 
judge would then determine whether the claim term has particular meaning 
based on its usage in the technical art, its claim drafting convention, the 
patent specification, or some combination of these considerations. The 
more deferential standard of appellate review would invigorate trial courts’ 
development of the factual record and place greater emphasis on skilled 
artisans, inventors, patent attorneys, and patent agents in tracing the 
drafting of patent claim terms and their understanding to skilled artisans in 
the context of the particular patent.344 This could produce battles of the 
experts, but no more so than in other areas in which courts must view 
documents or other evidence from a specialized standpoint. 
Over time, the district courts will likely better account for the fact–law 
distinction in their Patent Local Rules and Markman hearings. For 
example, courts could require litigants to more clearly set forth the intrinsic 
and extrinsic bases for claim construction, requiring a party seeking to 
bring forward expert testimony to disclose any gaps in the intrinsic record 
which skilled artisan testimony could fill. Furthermore, courts could 
innovate in the use of focused evidentiary hearings, possibly in conjunction 
with tutorials, for efficiently developing a factual record for claim 
construction. 
It will be important for trial judges to incorporate into their analysis 
the overarching notice goal of the patent system—that patent claims should 
be understood objectively from the standpoint of skilled artisans unless the 
patent affords an unambiguous scope. As William C. Robinson explained 
 
343 See MENELL, supra note 17, § 5.2.3.2.1. 
344 See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 
536 (1947) (“If a statute is written for ordinary folk, it would be arbitrary not to assume that Congress 
intended its words to be read with the minds of ordinary men. If they are addressed to specialists, they 
must be read by judges with the minds of the specialists.”). 
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more than a century ago, intrinsic evidence should play a critical role in 
claim construction, but courts should not be constrained in their resort to 
expert witnesses to assist them in reaching their interpretation.345 
CONCLUSION 
Since the resurgence of patent jury trials in the 1980s, the U.S. patent 
system has undergone a series of experiments aimed at improving the 
delineation of patent scope. While the Supreme Court’s Markman decision 
usefully removed claim construction from the black box of jury 
deliberations, the Federal Circuit’s efforts over the past sixteen years to 
guide claim construction have deeply frustrated the trial courts and failed to 
achieve transparent and effective results. In particular, the Federal Circuit’s 
adherence to the view that claim construction is a pure question of law 
subject to de novo appellate review has distorted the evidentiary foundation 
of claim construction determinations, delayed settlement of patent cases, 
run up litigation costs, and turned appellate review of nearly every patent 
case into relitigation of patent claim terms. 
As our empirical evidence reveals, the Federal Circuit has largely, but 
informally, renounced the de novo standard since its Phillips decision in 
2005. Whereas in 2004 the court reversed 44% of the claim terms it 
reviewed, in 2011 it did so for only 20% of terms. In one sense, therefore, 
claim construction has become more predictable; a favorable construction 
at the trial level is much more likely to withstand appellate review. That 
certainty should lead to increased predictability and lower costs for parties 
engaged in litigation. The rise of informal deference is likely a case of the 
realities of judging outpacing the law—many judges on the Federal Circuit 
have expressed criticism of the de novo standard, but the court has yet to 
formally alter the standard. 
This does not mean, however, that the problems of de novo review 
have been adequately resolved. The proper standard integrates fact-finding 
based on experts who can illuminate the perspective of skilled artisans and 
claim drafters with careful review of the intrinsic record. Lower courts’ 
assessments of such evidence should be upheld if not clearly erroneous or 
clearly contradicted by the specification or prosecution history. The Federal 
Circuit should review the intrinsic record on a more independent basis, but 
with due regard for the district court’s deliberations, proximity to the full 
record, and integration of the skilled artisan perspective. Were the Federal 
Circuit to embrace such a standard, lower courts would openly exercise 
their discretion to receive such evidence and build a forthright record 
supporting their interpretation. Such a hybrid appellate standard would 
foster better development of the basis for claim construction analysis while 
promoting earlier settlement of patent litigation and lower litigation cost. 
 
345 See ROBINSON, supra note 79, §§ 732–33. 
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Where the disputed claim term is particularly susceptible to skilled artisan 
construction, the district court’s ruling would carry great weight. But where 
the term is set forth or substantially constrained by the specification or 
prosecution history, then the intrinsic record would control. But even in the 
latter circumstance, the Federal Circuit should apply a heightened 
standard—a showing by the appellant of unambiguous evidence in the 
intrinsic record supporting an alternative construction—so as to promote 
settlement and reduce litigation costs and uncertainty. 
So long as the Federal Circuit clings to the view that claim 
construction is a question of law subject to de novo review, district courts 
will downplay their resort to experts and fact-finding in managing claim 
construction. So while informal deference may increase certainty and 
predictability, it undermines the quality of adjudication and appellate 
review by failing to elicit relevant evidence and by perpetuating opaque 
analysis and reasoning at the trial level. Thus, the time is ripe for the 
Federal Circuit (or the Supreme Court) to formally acknowledge the failure 
of the de novo experiment and articulate a more deferential standard that 
comports with the inherent nature of patent claim construction as a 
necessarily “mongrel”—mixed fact and law—practice. 
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APPENDIX A  
Coding Methodology 
An overinclusive search query was performed in order to locate the 
precedential and nonprecedential opinions dealing with claim construction. 
Once the opinions were collected, human coders read each case to 
determine relevancy.346 Cases that were deemed initially relevant were then 
passed along to a team of coders. Because Rule 36 cases are summary 
affirmances, it is impossible to determine relevancy from the appellate 
order. Therefore, coders examined the appellate briefs to determine initial 
relevancy of those cases. 
The “final disposition” code of each term (affirmed, reversed, avoided) 
serves as the basis for the reversal rates that appear throughout this Article. 
Avoidance of claim construction appeals often occurs when the Federal 
Circuit invalidates a patent (e.g., on obviousness grounds) and therefore 
does not reach other appealed issues that involve claim construction (e.g., 
infringement). Additionally, appeals arising from the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office were not included in the database because the 
USPTO’s claim construction standard (“broadest reasonable 
interpretation”) differs from that of the district courts. 
For technological areas, we coded each term according to a 
classification system used in previous studies of technology patenting.347 
Because patented inventions often straddle the boundaries of multiple 
technology categories, we permitted coding of up to four technology areas 
for each claim term.348 
For opinion cases (non-Rule 36 decisions), we collected 
“construction evidence”—data regarding the evidentiary sources referenced 
by the Federal Circuit in reaching its decision. This evidence relates to both 
the source of construction evidence (e.g., dictionaries) as well as the 
location of the evidence within the patent document (e.g., prosecution 
history). This information is not available for Rule 36 cases. 
 
346 Relevancy was defined as any case in which the meaning of a claim term was challenged on 
appeal. Thus, certain cases were excluded from our database that involved issues of claim construction, 
but did not involve appellate review of claim construction decisions. Those cases include: (1) cases in 
which the district court’s failure or refusal to construe a claim is challenged; (2) cases discussing 
formerly construed terms (either in separate cases or in a prior appeal of the case); (3) appeals of 
indefiniteness decisions; (4) appeals of prosecution history estoppel claims; (5) broadening reissue 
cases; (6) appeals of infringement or noninfringement that involve, but do not challenge, the meaning of 
claim language; and (7) doctrine of equivalents cases. 
347 See Allison & Lemley, supra note 272, at 2148 tbl.1. We used Allison and Lemley’s system 
with one additional category: business methods. 
348 Coders were asked to code at least one and up to four relevant technology areas. Because many 
cases can be coded as multiple technologies (for instance, “mechanical” and “automobile-related”), the 
percentages of all the technologies will sum greater than 100%. 
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Coded Variables 
Variable Coding 
Lower Court String 
Decision Date Date 
Procedural Posture on Appeal 
(1) Jury trial, (2) Bench trial, (3) Summary 
Judgment, (4) Mandamus, (5) Other 
Federal Circuit Panel  
(Authoring Judge & Panel Members) 
Judge Name 
Federal Circuit Dissenting Judge  
(if any)349 
Judge Name 
Precedential Nature of Opinion 
(1) Precedential, (2) Nonprecedential, 
(3) Rule 36 
Final Disposition of Case on Appeal 
(1) Affirm, (2) Reverse, (3) Reverse and 
Remand, (4) Vacate, (5) Vacate and Remand, 
(6) Other 
Field of Technology of the patent  
(up to four) 
(1) Mechanics, (2) Semiconductors, 
(3) Business Method, (4) Communications-
Related, (5) Computer-Related, 
(6) Pharmaceuticals, (7) Automobile-Related, 
(8) Biotechnology, (9) Chemistry, 
(10) Electronics, (11) Medical Devices, 
(12) Energy-Related, (13) Optics, 
(14) Software, (15) Acoustics 
Final Disposition of  
Claim Construction350 
(1) Affirmed, (2) Reversed, (3) Avoided 
Identify Person of Ordinary Skill 
(PHOSITA) 
Y/N 
Perspective of PHOSITA discussed? Y/N 
Intrinsic Evidence—Specification Y/N 
Intrinsic Evidence—Same Claim Y/N 
Intrinsic Evidence—Other Claims Y/N 
Intrinsic Evidence—Prosecution History Y/N 
Extrinsic Evidence— 
Expert Testimony/Tutorial 
Y/N 
Extrinsic Evidence—Dictionaries/Treatises Y/N 
Extrinsic Evidence—Other Y/N 
 
  
 
349 We also coded for the relevance of the dissent to the claim construction issue appealed. 
350 Avoided cases were not included in the results for this Article. 
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APPENDIX B  
Voting Patterns by Judge (50 Term Rolling Average) 
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APPENDIX C  
Reversal Rates by District 
District  
Pre-Phillips 
Reversal Rate  
(# of terms) 
Post-Phillips 
Reversal Rate  
(# of terms) 
Overall  
Reversal Rate  
(2000–2010) 
ITC  50.0% (24) 20.9% (43) 31.3% (67) 
N.D. Cal.  34.7% (101) 13.1% (61) 26.5% (162) 
C.D. Cal.  48.3% (58) 33.8% (65) 40.7% (123) 
S.D.N.Y.  43.8% (48) 37.9% (29) 41.6% (77) 
N.D. Ill.  25.0% (56) 29.5% (44) 27.0% (100) 
E.D. Tex.  31.8% (22) 12.5% (48) 18.6% (70) 
E.D. Va.  42.9% (42) 11.4% (35) 28.6% (77) 
D. Mass.  22.9% (35) 40.0% (30) 30.8% (65) 
D. Del.  40.0% (65) 17.6% (51) 30.2% (116) 
D. Minn. 50.0% (30) 17.4% (23) 35.8% (53) 
D.N.J. 44.0% (25) 22.2% (18) 34.9% (43) 
W.D. Wis. 12.5% (16) 24.0% (25) 19.5% (41) 
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APPENDIX D 
Regression Analysis351 
Variable Model 1 (Phillips Decision) 
Phillips Decision Date (Before/After) .744997 
(.1183801)*** 
Mechanical Patent -.2951718 
(.1492575)* 
Semiconductor Patent -.5581067 
(.2496073)* 
Business Method Patent -.9977604 
(.2664371)*** 
Communications-Related Patent .0239936 
(.2025926) 
Computer Patent -.4713033 
(.1625094)** 
Pharmaceutical Patent .5440078 
(.2698196)* 
Biotech Patent -.5266175 
(.2579594)* 
Chemical Patent -.4871186 
(.1876407)** 
Electrical Patent -.2586631 
(.146301) 
Medical Device Patent -.6095261 
(.1752781)** 
Energy-Related Patent .7468069 
(.508278) 
Software Patent .2441988 
(.1940789) 
Judge Michel .3139206 
(.2435436) 
Judge Friedman .3042246 
(.3001979) 
Judge Newman .5820316 
(.232259)* 
Judge Mayer .3819203 
(.2411087) 
 
351 This Table reports a logistic regression model that predicts Disposition_Term—a variable that is 
positive when the Federal Circuit affirms the claim construction of the district court. The explanatory 
variables include: Phillips (a binary variable that is positive when a case occurs after the Phillips 
decision), technology categories (binary variables that are positive when a patent covers a particular 
field of technology), and Federal Circuit judges present on the panel (binary variables that are positive 
when particular judges appear on the panel). The values reported are odds ratios and (standard errors). 
Significance is indicated as follows: 
(*), p ≤ .05 (Significant at the .05 level) 
(**), p ≤ .01 (Significant at the .01 level) 
(***), p ≤ .001 (Significant at the .001 level) 
N = 1745 
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Judge Plager .3122942 
(.2921773) 
Judge Lourie .2799947 
(.2294993) 
Judge Clevenger .4470275 
(.2430533) 
Judge Rader -.0845397 
(.2316365) 
Judge Schall .1379078 
(.2340243) 
Judge Bryson .220215 
(.2348821) 
Judge Gajarsa .3402931 
(.2296979) 
Judge Linn -.2966732 
(.2301291) 
Judge Dyk -.2218544 
(.2366453) 
Judge Prost .409444 
(.2474897)* 
Judge Moore .1900034 
(.2822021) 
